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GETTING PARENTS ]NVOL VED IN RACIALLY 
INTEGRATED SCHOOLS 
INTRODUCTION 
"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race. "1 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, a 
case that considered the constitutionality of school assignment 
policies that voluntarily considered the race of students. The 
Court held that voluntary race-conscious school assignments in 
school districts like Seattle, which were never subjected to a 
court-ordered desegregation mandate, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
Part I of this comment proposes that the Supreme Court's 
plurality decision in Parents Involved-the most recent in a 
series of school integration and civil rights decisions-promotes 
the theory of colorblindness, and rejects voluntary adoption of 
race-conscious remedies Lo promote racial integration in public 
schools. In its holding, the plurality reads the Equal Protection 
Clause as though it is part of a colorblind Constitution. This 
part of the comment suggests that colorblindness has emerged 
as the Court's preferred legal doctrine for accessing equal 
protection claims in the education context by analyzing the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, landmark 
desegregation cases, and the evolution of the theory of 
colorblindness. 
The Court's decision in Parents Involved prevents Seattle 
Public Schools from using race-conscious school assignments 
policies, and was determined without ample consideration of 
the history of segregation and institutional racism in Seattle. 
Part II of this comment suggests that the circumstances and 
history from which Seattle's school assignment plan evolved 
are especially useful in understanding the adoption of 
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Purents /nuolued 
IV), 551 U.S. 701, 718 (20ll7). 
2. /d. at 711. 
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colorblindness into public sentiment and as a type of political 
rhetoric. 
In Part III, Chief Justice Roberts's plurality and Justices 
Thomas and Kennedy's concurring opinions in Parents lnuolued 
are analyzed through the framework of colorblindness, with 
particular attention to how their opinions have not only 
embraced, but promoted colorblindness in considering 
voluntary school integration efforts. Conversely, the anti-
subordination principles asserted and lauded by ,Justice 
Breyer's dissenting opinion are examined as examples of 
alternative frameworks through which to assess voluntary 
integration and race-conscious school assignment plans. 
In Part IV, this comment proposes a three-part method 
through which Seattle, and similarly situated public school 
districts, may seek to institute race-consciOus school 
assignment policies. This portion of the comment further 
analyzes and interprets Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion 
in Parents Inuolued to suggest school districts must first 
exhaust all race-neutral and generally race-conscwus 
assignment policies before implementing race-conscious 
policies that classify and assign students to schools on the basis 
of race. This comment further suggests that the 
implementation of race-conscious assignment policies could 
challenge the Court's utilization of colorblindness in 
determining the constitutionality of secondary school 
assignments. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ADOPTION OF 
COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SCHOOL INTEGRATION 
CASES 
Parents lnuolued is the most recent school integration case 
considered by the Supreme Court. In Brown and subsequent 
school integration cases, the Court utilized anti-subordination 
principles and a color conscious reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A common thread in these cases was the Court's 
recognition of the impact of historical circumstances and 
persistent social realities of discrimination and segregation on 
efforts to integrate public schools. However, the Court 
abandoned this framework in Parents Inuolued and instead 
applied a colorblind reading of the Constitution and Fourteenth 
Amendment. Colorblindness is an "anticlassification principle, 
premised on the belief that the Constitution protects 
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individuals, not groups, and so bars a11 racial classifications, 
except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing.":) Part I of this 
comment argues that the Court's holding in Parents Involved is 
H dc;pHrture from the intended application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and can best be understood within the context of 
civil rights decisions since the mid-1970s, which adopt the 
rhetoric of colorblindness and reject efforts to remedy historical 
discrimination through race-conscious measures. 
A. Colorblind Constitutionalism 
Colorblind Constitutionalism is neither contextual nor 
historical; it dismisses the anti-subordination principles that 
the Equal Protection Clause was intended to embody, 
specifically to prevent the state from inflicting status harm 
against racial minorities.4 Advocates of colorblindness believe 
individuals should be treated without regard to their race,5 and 
insist the government should never make race-based 
decisions.6 Colorblind rhetoric is ahistorical.7 It rejects an 
examination of social reality, based in historical discrimination 
and subordination, and instead portrays the explicit use of race 
as morally and legally wrong,s prioritizing individualism over 
the "substantive claims of historically oppressed groups."9 
Proponents of colorblindness have successfully attacked and 
dismantled programs like integration efforts and affirmative 
action programs that consciously utilize race in efforts to 
remedy continuing discrimination and racism.lO Similarly, 
anti-classification principles assert that equality means a 
:l. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorhlindness to Antihalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race /~quality Cases, 120 YALE L .• J. 127H, 12H1 (2011). 
1. ]{eva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisuhordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HAI(V. L. RIW. 1170, 1511-15 
(2001). 
5. Wendy Parkl,r, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause lloberts Style. 6:l U. 
M IA!\11. L. l{EV. 507, 526 (2009). 
6. IAN HANEY il>I'EZ, WHIT!•; BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTIWCTION OF ]{ACI•; 121 
(]{iehard Delgado & ,Jt,an Stefaneic eds., 1Oth Anniversary ed. 2006). 
7. Cedric Ml,rlin Powell, Schools, Hhctorical Neutrality, and the Failure of the 
Colorblind /~qual Protection Clause, 10 IWTwms RAn; & L. l{!•;v. :l62, :lHO (200H). 
8. Ian F. Haney Lopez. l'ost·Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 9H CALl F. L. ]{~;v. 102:1, 1061 (201 0). 
9. Powell, supra note 7, at :J65. 
10. See L6pez, supra note 8, at 1 o:l8. 
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commitment to protect individuals rather than groups from all 
forms of racial classification, even benign classifications.!! 
Contrary to the pronouncements of colorblind proponents, the 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment are race 
conscious documents. 
When the Constitution was ratified, the institution of 
slavery, meaning the enslavement of Africans by Europeans 
and Americans, was a cornerstone of American society and 
economics.l2 Slavery was a racialized institution with Whites 
as free masters who owned African slaves as property.1:3 Thus 
the terms "master" and "slave" carried with them racial 
meaning. Consciousness of race is evident in the first three 
words of the Constitution, "We the people."l4 This phrase refers 
to "the whole Number of free persons,"l5 where "free" denotes 
the exclusion of Mrican slaves. As Professor Paul Finkelman 
asserts: "The Constitution of 1787 was a proslavery document, 
designed to prevent any national assault on slavery, while at 
the same time structured to protect the interests of 
slaveowners at the expense of African Americans."IG The 
institution of slavery was protected in the Constitution through 
the Three-Fifths Clause, 17 the prohibitory clause against 
ending the African slave trade before 1808,18 and the Fugitive 
Slave Clause.l9 Additional clauses of the Constitution 
indirectly guarded slavery, making the Constitution a pro-
slavery and race-conscious document.20 
11. Siegel, supra note :l, at 1288. 
12. See Douglas F. Dowd, The r;cunomics of Slavery in the Ante Helium ::louth: A 
Comment, 66 .J. POL. ECON. 441 (1958). 
1 :l. See Kathryn T. Gines. Hace Thinlcing and Hacism in Hannah Arendt's The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, in HANNAH AI!ENJJT ANil 'I'll": USES OF HISTOI!Y: 
lMI'I•:IliALISM, NATION. HAC!<:, AND GI·:NOCiflJo: :18, 1() (lhchard H. King & Dan Stone eds., 
2007) ("lW]hen we look at the specific casl' of slavery in the United States. we find a 
system in which blach people were born slaves and white people wen' born free."). 
11. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. :J. Thurgood Marshall, Heflections on the 
Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. 101 HAI!V. L. HEY. 1, 2 (19S7). The text 
of thl' Constitution does not use the word "slavery," but instead refers to slaves as 
"other persons," "such persons," or a "person held to Sl,rvice or Labour." Paul 
Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the f'roslavery 
Constitution. :l2 AKI!O!'J L. REV. 12:1, 127 (1999). 
16. Finkelman. supra note 15, at 121. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I,~ 2, cl. il. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9, cl. 1. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. :l. 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (allowing Congress to prohibit the naturalization 
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The Fourteenth Amendment is not colorblind;21 it was 
enacted specifically to protect "against discrimination because 
of race or color."22 During the Reconstruction Era, many 
Southern statc~s passed Rlack Codes, which limited the rights 
of Blacks to own property and permitted imprisonment for 
unemployment.2:1 The Thirty-ninth Congress responded by 
passing the Reconstruction Acts and the Civil Rights Acts, as 
well as establishing the Freedmen's Bureau to support former 
slaves by providing food, hospitals, land, and education.24 
President Johnson vetoed the bill to create the Freedmen's 
Bureau, objecting to the special benefits to Blacks.25 However, 
the Thirty-ninth Congress overrode Johnson's veto, rejecting 
his concerns about the race-conscious remedy of special 
benefits.26 The Thirty-ninth Congress, which established the 
Freedmen's Bureau and embraced providing special relief for 
of non-white~); U.S. CONST. art. :l. ~ 2, cl. I (diversity of jurisdiction limiting the right to 
~up in fedl,ral courts to "citizen~." thus excluding slaves and free Blacks); U.S. CoNST. 
art. '1. § I (n,quiring l)ach state to grant legal recognition to tlw laws of other statl's 
including law~ protecting slavery); ,Juan F. Perc• a, The /Jlach! White Uinary Paradigm 
of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 1-\5 CALIF. L. i{IW. 121:l. 
1252 (1997) ("The fact that thP text of the Constitution protect~ slavPry in so many 
placl's demonstratl'S the importance of slavery in the foundation of the country."); Earl 
M. Maltz, The Idea of thc Proslrwery Constitution, 17 ,J. EARLY REPUBLIC :l7. :l7 (HJ97) 
('"In recl'nt years, the idl•a that tlw Con~titution of 17H7 should hl' viewed as proslavery 
has gained increa~ed currency in acadPmic literature .... While some signiflcant 
dissenter~ remain, this thesis has clearly become an important thl,me in assessments 
of the role of slavery in American constitutional developml,nt."). 
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
22. Strauder v. WPst Virginia, 100 U.S. :iO:l. :no (11-179): sec also Christoplwr W. 
Schmidt, Listening to History~ Parcnts lnuolued, /Jrown, and the Colorblind 
Constitution, TH 1•: LlcGAL WORKSHOP (Apr. :iO, 2009), 
h ttp://1 ega! works hop. org/2009/(H/:l0/1 i ~teen i ng- to-history· parents-in vol Vl'd-brown -and-
the-colorblind-constitution/print/ ("The anticlassification principle that constitutes the 
heart of colorblind constitutionalism has littk basis in thP original meaning of tbl' 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
2:l. See i.e., An Act to J;;stablish and Regulate the Domestic Relations of Persons 
of Color and to Amend the Law in Relation to Paupers and Vagrancy, 1H65 S.C. Acts 
269, available at http://www.tl,achingushistory.org/pdfs/BiackCodes OOO.pdf; see also 
Hegents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 1:l8 U.S. 265, :i90 (197S) (Marshall. ,J.. 
dissenting). 
21. Bahhe, •J:l8 U.S. at :l91 (Marshall, .J., dissenting). 
25. See id. at :l97 (Marshall, ,J., dissenting) (The bill was "solely and entirely for 
the f'rePdmen, and to the exclusion of all other persons," CONCJ. GLOBE. :l9th Cong., 1st 
Scss. 511 (1866) (remarkH of J{ep. Taylor)). 
26. Sce id. 
454 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
former slaves, also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.27 It 
1s therefore illogical to conclude that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was devised without consideration of race-
conscious remedies.28 The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to protect newly freed 
former slaves.29 The Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
privileges of citizenship to Blacks,:3o and in doing so, provided a 
race-conscious remedy to the institution of slavery.:H 
Upon its ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
understood as an effort to eliminate the racial caste system 
created and perpetuated by the institution of slavery, not as a 
means to ban all distinctions made on the basis of race.:l2 The 
Equal Protection Clause does not require that minorities and 
non-minorities be treated the same when remedying distinct 
disadvantages.:i:l The Court recognized this fundamental 
element of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Era 
school desegregation cases.34 
27. Melissa L. Saunders, }~qual Protection, Class /,egislation, and 
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. R~:v. 2!15, 270-7:3 (1997). 
28. See id. at 271 (noting that "[tjhose who read the Equal Prott•ction Clause as 
nmdering all race-hased state action pn;sumptivdy unconstitutional rely primarily on 
the specific historical events that precipitated its addition to tlw Constitution."). See 
also Schmidt, supra note 22 ("The legislators who in 1866 drafted the Amendment also 
passed distinctly color-conscious legislation designed to help the newly freed slaves."). 
29. See generally Maltz. supra note 20: Stauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. :JO:l 
(1879). 
:lO. I use the term "Black" throughout this paper for tht; reasons articulated hy 
Professors Kimherle W. Crenshaw and Cheryl I. Harris. Professor Crenshaw statps: 
"Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural h'Toup 
and, as such, n;quire dtmotation as a proper noun." Kimherl(; W. Crenshaw, Race, 
Heform, and Hetrenchment: Transformation and /,egitimization in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 :J:ll, 1:332 n.2 (1988). Professor Harris statt;s: "[T[he use of 
the upper case and lower case in reference to racial identity has a particular political 
history .... 'White' has incorporated Black subordination; 'Black' is not hased on 
domination." Cheryl!. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. ltEV. 1707, 1710 n.:l 
(199:l). 
::ll. Maltz, supra note 20, at 166. "All of the civil rights enactments and court 
decisions deemed major in this area have sought to redress harms to Blacks." 
:32. Powell, supra note 7. at :379. 
:3:3. Brent K Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 
MICH. J. !{ACE & L. 51, 76-77 (1996). 
:31. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), :3!17 U.S. !18:3 (195!1); Gn;c;n v. Cnty. Sch. 
Bd .. :391 U.S. !l::lo (1968). 
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B. Early Civil-rights Era Desegregation Cases Recognized the 
Anti-Subordination Principles of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court's celebrated decision in Brown u. Board 
of Education outlawed state-mandated racial segregation and 
provided the legal tenants upon which subsequent school 
integration and civil rights cases have been based.35 The 
decision in Brown conveys anti-subordination principles, 
declaring that the states may not engage in practices that 
enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed 
peoples.:36 The court cited social realities of discrimination and 
segregation, stating: "To separate them [Black students] ... 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.":37 The court's 
decision in Brown embraced an anti-subordination perspective 
that treats race as a socially and legally produced "hierarchical 
system structurally embedded in U.S. society.":l8 
Professor Christopher Schmidt asserts: "The Brown 
decision actually reflected a conscious effort by the Justices to 
not accept the general principle of colorblind 
constitutionalism.":19 ln Brown and subsequent school 
integration cases, the Supreme Court utilized anti-
subordination principles, taking into account social realities 
and the effects of segregation in determining school 
desegregation cases.40 Additionally, the Court recognized the 
power of school districts to implement color-conscious 
:35. See Brown I, :H7 U.S. at 18:3, 191-95. 
:36. Siegel. supra note 1, at 1172-Tl. (The question presented in nrown u. Bd. of 
/''due. was: "Does segregation of children in public schools soldy on the basis of race, 
eVl'n though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive 
the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?" :l17 U.S. ·18:3, 
19;3 (1951)). The framing of this legal question was a strategic choice of thl' Plaintiffs. 
who encouraged the Court to protect Black children from stigma and self-hatred, 
ratJwr than insisting the Court dismantle de jure segregation. See Lani Guinier, From 
Racial I~iberalism to Uacial Uteracy: Brown v. Board of Education and the lntercst-
JJiucrRencc Dilemma,~)] .J. AM. HIST. 92 (20(J1). 
:37. Brown I, :317 U.S. at 191. 
:l8. Ian F. Haney Lopl,z, "A Nation of Minorities':· Race, l~thnicity, and 
Heactionary Colorblindn!'ss, 59 STAN. L. RIN. 985, 990 (2007). 
:J~J. Schmidt, supra note 22 (emphasis added). 
•10. See Siegd, supra notl' 1, at 1111. 
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integration plans.41 
In 1968, Green u. County School Board defined the 
standards by which integration efforts were deemed 
sufficient.42 The court determined that the New Kent County 
School District remained a racially segregated "dual system" 
fourteen years after Brown. 43 Dr. Calvin Green, the founding 
president of the New Kent County Chapter of the NAACP, sued 
the New Kent County School Board in 1965 for maintaining a 
racially segregated school system.44 The district's "freedom-of-
choice" plan required Black families to petition for admittance 
to attend white schools.45 Blacks who dared to petition for 
admittance to white schools were threatened with the prospect 
of physical violence and economic sanctions from whites who 
opposed integration.46 The "freedom-of-choice" plan proved 
ineffective to promote integration: three years after the 
adoption of the plan, not a single white child chose to attend 
the historically Black Watkins school, and 86%1 of Black 
children continued to attend Watkins.47 Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, specifically stated, "the burden on a 
school board today is to come forward with a plan that 
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to 
work now."48 
Dr. Green asserted that President Eisenhower's famous 
remarks about all deliberate speed "meant take it slow and not 
upset the country . . . put brakes on all four wheels of 
Brown.""-9 Justice Brennan's opmwn m Green seems to 
11. See. qr, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 102 U.S. 1 (1971). 
·12. See Gn,en v. Cnty. Sch. Bel., :l91 U.S.1:Hl (1961:1). 
1:1. ld. at 111. 
-11. !d. at :H2. Virginia attempted to resist intehrration by passing a "resolution 
of interposition'' in 19fi(i, which stated that the Court's mandatP to intt>grate was 
incompatible with the state constitution, and thus inapplicable in Virginia. The New 
Kt>nt County school board adopted the freedom of choice plan in order to remain 
eligible' for f(,deral financial aid. Jd. 
<15. IJeterminin!{ the Facts: Rcadin!{ 1: History of Charles C. Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County, V !\, NI'S.<:OV, 
http://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/1 01newkent./1 01facts l.htm (last visited 
May 17, 2012). 
16. ld. 
<17. Green,:l91 U.S.at111. 
<11:1. !d. at 1:-19 (emphasis added). 
19. IJeterminin!{ the Facts: Readin!{ 3: Perspectives on the New Kent County 
J.;xpcricncc, 
http://www .nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/kssons/1 01 new kent/] 01 facts:J. h tm 
May 17, 2012). 
Nl's.<:ov, 
(last visited 
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recognize the impact "all deliberate speed"GO had in delaying 
racial integration in public schools, and attempted to address 
obstructions to integration by ordering District Court oversight 
of the case and the school board's integration plan.Gl Perhaps 
most importantly, the court considered social realities of New 
Kent County and the South more broadly: the New Kent 
County district delayed its first step towards integration for 
eleven years after Brown,52 poverty deterred Black families 
from choosing formerly all-white schools, and Black families 
were threatened with violence and subject to harassment as a 
consequence of enrolling in white schools.58 The Court's 
decision in Green utilized an anti-subordination framework in 
recognizing continuing subordination and inequality for racial 
minorities in both American society and public schools. 
Post-Brown school integration cases also enunciated the 
power of local school districts to enact integration plans. The 
Supreme Court's 1971 unanimous decision in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education permitted "wide-
ranging remedial orders to ensure that segregated or 'dual' 
systems were eliminated."54 In Swann, the Court considered 
the integration plan for Charlotte-Mecklenburg public schools 
and the duty of school boards to eliminate segregated public 
schools.55 The integration plan at issue in Swann included 
rezoning school attendance lines, grouping white schools with 
Black schools, and busing students to create racially integrated 
schools.56 Chief Justice Burger's opinion stated the objective 
50. Green :l91 U.S. at 't:l6. 
fi 1. See id. at 1:i9. nrown prohibikd state-mandated segregation, but the court 
refused to address the issues of appropriate remedy in 13rown v. /3oard of l~ducation II, 
and instead n;kgated this task to lower courts to pmceed "with all deliberate speed." 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (/3rown If), 319 U.S. 291, :l01 (1955). 
52. Green, :l91 U.S. at 1:l8 ("In determining whether n•spondl;nt School Board 
met that command by adopting its 'freedom-of-choice' plan, it is relevant that this first 
stPp did not come until some 11 years aftc;r Brown I was decided and 10 yl;ars after 
Brown II direeted the making of a 'prompt and reasonable start."'). 
5:l. I d. at 111 n.c-d. 
fi1. CHAilLES ,J. O<iLI•:TIU•:J•:, ,JR., ALL 0ELIBEilATE SPEED: ]{J<:I•'LI•:CTIONS 0:'-J THE 
FiilST HALF Ci•:NTURY OF /Ji!OWN V. IJOA/W OF l~nUCATII!N, 170 (2001). 
55. Swann v. Charlottl;-Mecklenburg Bd. of !~due., 102 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971). 
5fi. !d. at 10 ("Thl; Finger plan does as much by rezoning school attendance linPs 
as can reasonably be accomplished. However, unlike the board plan, it does not stop 
thl•re. It goes further and dc;segregates all thl' rest of the elementary schools by the 
techniqm• of grouping two or three outlying schools with one black inner city school; by 
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remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of 
state-imposed segregation and reiterated the Court's holding in 
Green "that school authorities are 'clearly charged with the 
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated root and branch."'57 The Court upheld the 
integration plan, and reaffirmed the Court's previous 
pronouncement that school authorities are best equipped to 
determine and carry out integration policies: 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power 
to formulate and implement educational policy and might 
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students 
to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a 
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the 
proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an 
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of 
school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional 
violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a 
federal court.58 
It is noteworthy that the Court distinguished between the 
powers of local school districts and federal courts. Federal 
courts would only have the authority to "fashion a remedy that 
will assure a unitary school system" to remedy a proven 
Constitutional violation.59 In contrast, Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion stated that school authorities may choose to enact 
educational policies that result in schools reflective of the racial 
demographics of the school district as a whole.fiO Such 
educational policies would, like the integration plan in Swann, 
be color conscious plans. This deference to local districts to 
implement race consciOus school assignment plans was 
acknowledged in post-Brown elementary and secondary 
desegregation cases, but was challenged in the 1970s. 
transporting black students from grades one through four to the outlying white schools; 
and by transporting white students from the fifth and sixth grades from the outlying 
white schools to the inner city black schools."'). 
57. /d.at15. 
58. /d. at 16. 
59. /d. 
60. ld. Sec John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Hacial 
Discrimination, 11 U. CHI. L. i{EV. 72:!, 721-25 (1971). 
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C. The Court Abandoned Color-Conscious Measures and 
Adopted Colorblindness Amid Civil Rights Backlash 
459 
Throughout the 1960s federal and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions upheld the right of state and local governments to 
implement race-conscious measures to remedy de facto 
segregation in public elementary and secondary schools.fll 
Professor Reva Siegel describes this framework: "Courts, in 
other words, understood equal protection as a race-asymmetric 
constraint on governmental action; they understood that the 
purpose of equal protection doctrine was to prevent the state 
from inflicting certain forms of status harm on minorities."62 It 
was not until the 1970s that race-conscious assignment policies 
and voluntary desegregation initiatives were challenged as 
"invidious discrimination."6:3 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, America was amid an 
intense Civil Rights backlash.64 This anti-civil rights sentiment 
was pronounced through Presidential candidate Richard 
Nixon's "Southern Strategy"65 and the increased incidents of 
violence and overt racism against Blacks and Civil Rights 
activists. In 1968, Nixon ran his presidential campaign against 
the Warren Court on issues of race, appealing to the silent 
majority of Northern whites concerned about the impact of 
desegregation decrees on their societal status.66 Nixon's 
campaign opposed welfare, busing, quotas and affirmative 
action.67 Upon taking office, Nixon appointed four Supreme 
Court Justices to uphold these ideals: Justices Burger, 
61. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1511. 
62. !d. 
(i:l. !d. at 1517 (citing Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 2:!7 N .K2d '198. 501 (Ill. 19GH); 
Olson v. Bd. of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Fuller v. Yolk. 2:30 F. Supp. 
25 (D.N .• J. 1961); Morean v. Bd. of Educ., 200 A.2d 97 (N .. J HJ61); Balaban v. !{ubin. 
199 N.K2d :n5, :n7 (N.Y. 1961)). 
6•1. For a detai!Pd discussion of post Brown backlash. see Michael .J. Klarman. 
How Brown ChanRed Race Relations: The Bachlash 1'hcs1:s, Ill .J. AM. HIST. 81 (1991); 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Ciuil RiRhts Mouement. 80 VA. L. 
Hev. 7 (1991). 
65. Nixon's "Southern Strategy" focused on winning southern votl~s by inhibiting 
dt>segn~gation, crPating l'ducational alternatives to integrated schools, and appointing 
consPrvatives to the federal bench. See Frank Brown, Nixon's "Southern Strcztegy" and 
Forces Awzinst Brown. 7:l.J. OF N~<:<;JW EllUC. 191 (2001). 
66. Siegel, supra note ·1, at 1522. 
67. !d. at 1522-2:!. 
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Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun.68 By the 1970s, the 
Supreme Court had changed considerably and the pro-civil 
rights Warren court was dismantled.69 This transition is 
particularly notable in the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,70 which 
departed from considerations of anti-subordination, and 
instead adopted the concept of anti-classification and the 
reasoning of colorblindness. 
Bakke was a challenge to the special admissions program of 
the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, 
which allotted 16 of 100 slots for minority applicants.71 Bakke, 
a white, male applicant, filed suit alleging the special 
admissions program "operated to exclude him from the school 
on the basis of his race."72 The Supreme Court considered the 
validity of the special admissions program under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 73 The Court's 
adoption of colorblindness begins with Bakke and is most 
recently manifested in Parents Involved. 
There was no majority opinion in Bakke, but Justice 
Powell's opinion announced the judgment of the Court.74 
,Justice Powell's opmwn promoted the anti-classification 
principles of colorblindness, which are intolerant of any use of 
racial classification; he concluded: "Racial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for 
the most exacting judicial examination."75 Powell argued race 
based classifications demand strict scrutiny, which would 
require the state to demonstrate a compelling interest for 
implementing affirmative action policies like the University of 
California's admission policy. 76 Citing the school desegregation 
cases following Brown, Powell stated the state has a legitimate 
Gtl. /d. at 152:3. 
69. For example, ,Justice f{ehnquist's firmly held anti-civil rights opinions dated 
at least as far back as his days derking for .Justice ]{obert ,Jackson during Brown. 8e!' 
Memorandum from William Hehnquist, Law Clerk, ,Justice Hobert ,Jackson, entitled "fl. 
f{andom Thought on the Segregation Cases'' (1952). Rehnquist stated: "I realize it is an 
unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been l•xcoriated by 'liberal' 
colleagues, [sic] but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed." 
70. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 1:l8 U.S. 2()5, 271 (1978). 
71. /d. 
72. /d. at 277-78. 
7il. !d. at 281. 
7·1. /d. at 2G9. 
75. !d. at 291; Siegel, supra note :l, at 1288. 
7(). Bahhe, 1:18 U.S. at 291. 
21 GETTING PARENTS INVOLVED 461 
interest in eliminating the effects of discrimination but 
differentiated the admissions policy of the University of 
California from the school desegregation cases. 77 He stated the 
University policy sought to remedy "the effects of 'societal 
discrimination"' in contrast to the school desegregation cases in 
which "the States were required by court order to redress the 
wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination."78 
Powell defined the University affirmative action program as "a 
classification that aids persons perceived as members of 
relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent 
individuals m the absence of judicial, legislative, or 
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations," and he concluded the University had not 
demonstrated a compelling interest "for inflicting such 
harm."79 Powell did note a compelling interest for an 
institution of higher education to attain "a diverse student 
body" but specified "ethnic diversity, however, is only one 
element in a range of factors a university properly may 
consider in attaining the goal."80 Powell concluded the 
University of California's special admissions program, which 
"focused solely on ethnic diversity" did not further the 
compelling state interest in achieving "genuine diversity."Sl 
Conversely, the opinion of Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting in part, argued that the 
school desegregation cases held "school boards, even in the 
absence of a judicial finding of past discrimination, could 
voluntarily adopt plans which assigned students with the end 
of creating racial pluralism" and that the elimination of 
discrimination "was recognized as a compelling social goal 
justifying the overt use of race."82 The dissenting opinion 
argued that "race-conscious remedies have been approved" 
without a "judicial finding of discrimination" and that such a 
requirement would "severely undermine efforts to achieve 
77. !d. at :307. 
711. !d. 
79. !d. at :307-09. 
80. /d. at :312- J!l. 
81. !d. aL :-Jl,t-15. 
82. !d. at :36il. 
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voluntary compliance with the requirements of law."S:'l 
However, Powell's opinion as the Court's de facto ruling 
concluded that the government's use of racial classifications 
must meet strict scrutiny and may not be voluntarily adopted 
to remedy societal discrimination, thereby promoting the 
rhetoric of colorblindness.84 
Powell further promoted colorblindness through the concept 
of "ethnic fungibility": The idea that each person "bears an 
'ethnicity' with an equivalent legal significance and with an 
identical claim to protection."85 He stated: "The United States 
had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and 
to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not 
of a monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed of various 
minority groups."86 By asserting this narrative, Powell 
portrayed the experience of racial minorities in American as 
indistinguishable from that of other racial groups, including 
whites.87 Powell stated: "The guarantee of equal protection 
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to a person of another color. If 
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not 
equal."88 Powell diminished the significant role of race in the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in prior Civil Rights 
cases, and in contemporary American society, thereby 
promoting the notion of a "color blind" Constitution.89 The 
introduction of ethnic fungibility allowed Powell to depict 
whites as a victimized group suffering as the result of the 
University's affirmative action program. 
In contrast, Justice Marshall's dissent detailed the history 
in which Africans were brought to America, enslaved, and 
8:3. /d. at :361. 
81. Lopez, supra note :m. at 10:31. 
H5. !\Inn Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1.98.9, G1 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1107, 1112 (1990); See also Brynn K. Fair, Notes of a ]{acial Caste Baby: Color 
Blindness and the End of Affirmative Action 121 (1997). 
H6. Bahhe, 1:18 U.S. at 292. 
H7. L6pez. supra note :38 at 10:36 ("He disaggregated the white 'majority' into 
'various minority groups' who 'struggle' against 'prejudice,' while converting racial 
minorities into groups that shared an identical American experience with white 
ethnics."). 
88. Bakke, 1:lH U.S. nt 289-90. 
H9. L6pez, supra note :l8, at 1010 ("Powell erased whites as a dominant group 
and summoned instead whites as pott~ntial minorities in the brave new world of civil 
rights and racial remediation."). 
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denied human rights.90 He continued by describing the 
compromises and ratification of the Constitution, which 
protected the institution of slavery and denied equal rights to 
Blacks; the oppression of Black Americans through the 
antebellum, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow Eras; and concluded 
by noting the "still disfavored position" of Blacks in America.91 
Justice Marshall stated: "Neither its history nor our past cases 
lend any support to the conclusion that a university may not 
remedy the cumulative effects of society's discrimination by 
giving consideration to race in an effort to increase the number 
and percentage of Negro doctors."92 Marshall's historical 
account--coupled with a recognition of persistent social 
conditions-exemplified an anti-subordination perspective, "a 
distinctly color-conscious interpretation of the equal protection 
requirement"9:3 that asserts "it is wrong for the state to engage 
in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically 
oppressed groups."94 Powell's opinion adopted the opposite, 
anti-classification perspective, which is "premised on the belief 
that the Constitution protects individuals, not groups, and so 
bars all racial classifications, except as a remedy for specific 
wrongdoing."95 Thus, Powell's decision in Bakke made the 
concept of colorblindness part of judicial precedent by insisting 
that race could not be consciously utilized for promoting racial 
justice, and must be limited only to remedying past de jure 
discrimination.96 The Court furthered Bakke's promotion of 
colorblindness in Grutter v. Bollinger, and it is this legal 
precedent from which Parents Involved developed.97 
D. Grutter and the Compelling Government Interest of Diversity 
In 2003, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v. 
90. !lalda•. 1:38 U.S. at :mH. 
91. /d. at :lH9-9H. 
92. !d. at :mo. 
9:1. Christopher W. Schmidt, Essay, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 91 
Cornell L. l{ev. 20:1, 207 (200H). 
91. Siegel, supra note 1, at J;t72-7:l. 
95. Sieged, supra note :l, at 12H 1. 
9fi. Freeman, supra note t->5, at 1125. 
97. L<'lpez, supra note at->, at lmll ("Not until the 19HOs would any .Justices 
support constitutional colorblindness, and then they would do so by invoking the 
reasoning offered in Bakke not by the anticlassification .Justices, but by Powell."). 
464 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL l2012 
Bollinger upheld the University of Michigan Law School 
admissions policy, which weighed race as one of many factors 
in deciding admissions.98 Barbara Grutter, a white applicant, 
brought the case against the law school alleging that her 
application was rejected because the law school used race as a 
"predominant" factor, giving preference to applicants from 
certain minority groups.99 She further alleged that the law 
school had no compelling interest to justify the use of race and 
sought an injunction prohibiting the law school from using race 
in this manner, damages, and an order requiring the law school 
to grant her admission.lOO 
Justice O'Connor expanded upon Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke, holding "all racial classifications imposed by 
government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny,"' which reqmres racial classifications be 
"narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental 
interests."lOl O'Connor concluded that "student body diversity" 
in higher education is a compelling government interest.l02 
Her reasoning relied on amici briefs citing the importance of 
diversity in the military and corporate workplaces, and 
emphasized the importance of preparing students for "work 
and citizenship."lO:J However, O'Connor did not address the 
promotion of racial diversity in higher education as a means to 
address persistent racial inequalities, especially for students 
who come from minority groups that have been historically 
excluded and underrepresented in higher education and 
professional programs like law schools.l04 The majority 
determined that the law school admissions program was 
sufficiently narrowly tailored, and O'Connor's opmwn 
emphasized the law school's use of "diversity" giving weight to 
many factors besides race through a "highly individualized, 
holistic review."l05 She stressed that the law school diversity 
98. Gruttt:r v. Bollinger, 5il9 U.S. il06 (200il). 
9(). !d. at :no. 
100. !d. at :l17. 
I 01. !d. at :l26. 
102. ld. at il28. 
10:l. !d. at :l:ll. 
HH. See Derrick Bell, Diuersity's Distractions, lOil CoLUM. L. RI•:V. 1622. 1625 
(200:3) ("Thu8, it was diversity in the classroom, on the work floor, and in the military, 
not the need to address past and continuing racial barriers, that gained O'Connor's 
votl,.''). 
105. Grutter. 5:l9 U.S. at :l:l7. 
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admissions policy included "many possible bases" such as 
students who have "lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent 
in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and 
family hardship, have exceptional records of (~xtensive 
community service, and have had successful careers in other 
fields."106 O'Connor's reasoning embraced anti-classification 
principles, highlighting the "truly individualized consideration" 
of the law school's admissions plan as in conformity with 
Justice Powell's colorblind approach in Bakke.107 
Professor Wendy Parker writes that, while the "Grutter 
majority clearly supports the idea of integration, and links 
diversity to the benefits of integration[,] ... the meaning of 
integration through diversity, unlike school desegregation 
jurisprudence, is not transformative."108 As a result, 
historically white institutions may use diversity so some 
minority students arc admitted, but not so many as to change 
the racial identity of the institution.l 09 Therefore, diversity, 
compared to affirmative action or desegregation policies, does 
not seek to challenge the status quo, or create social change. 
Parker notes that the majority opinion in Grutter simply notes 
that "race unfortunately still matters"llO without examining or 
discussing why this is true, or "what it might tell us about the 
need for affirmative action."lll Derrick Bell asserts that 
O'Connor "perceived in the Michigan Law School's admissions 
program an affirmative action plan that minimizes the 
importance of race while offering maximum protection to 
whites and those aspects of society with which she 
identifies."ll2 
The requirements for assessing higher education diversity 
admissions policies enunciated in Grutter were utilized by the 
Court to evaluate race-conscious secondary school integration 
policies in Parents Involved. The Court's holding in Parents 
106. /d. at :l:lH. 
107. /d. at :n1. 
101\. Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: A((irmatiue Action Wins, in 
EDUCATION LAW STOI{IES 96, 102 (Michael Olivas & Rorma Grdf Schneider eds., 2008). 
109. !d. 
110. Orutter, G:l9 U.S. at :J:l:J. 
111. Parker, supra note 108, at 1 O:J. 
112. Bell, supru note 101, at ]()25. 
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Involved, prohibiting Seattle Public Schools from using race-
conscious school assignment policies, is an extension of 
colorblindness into the secondary school context, and was 
determined without consideration of the history of segregation 
and institutional racism in Seattle. Rather, the Court's 
promotion of colorblindness as legal doctrine parallels the 
adoption of colorblindness in political rhetoric and popular 
discourse. 
11. COLORDLINDNESS AS POPULAR AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN SEATTLE AND SEATTLE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
The evolution of colorblindness as political rhetoric and 
popular opinion is exemplified through an examination of the 
history of segregation in Seattle and the Seattle School Board's 
struggle to integrate schools. The Supreme Court's plurality 
opinion in Parents Involved ignores the depth of the Seattle 
story, and treats Seattle abstractly without focusing on the 
significant circumstances from which this case evolved. The 
events and conditions from which Parents Involved developed 
provide a vivid setting to understand the development of 
colorblindness as popular and political discourse. 
A. Legalized Housing Discrimination in Seattle Created a 
Segregated School System 
After the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Seattle School Board began collecting demographic data about 
the racial makeup of its schools.11 :3 Frances Owen, President of 
the Seattle School Board in 1954 noted "our feeling at that time 
was 'it was not our fault that the schools were segregated."'114 
In 1957, the first year Seattle collected these data, the School 
Board found 5%) of its 91,782 students were Black, and 81<% of 
these Black students "were concentrated in nine of the city's 
112 schools."115 These discrepancies in racial concentration 
11 :l. Douglas ,Judge, Housinl{, Race and Schoolinl{ in Seattle: Context for the 
Supreme Court Decision, J. Enuc. CONTI!OVEI!SY, 
http://www. wee. wwu.edu/resources/cep/ejournallv002n00 1 /a011.shtml (last visited May 
1il, 2012). 
1 H. Doris H. Pil'ruth, With All JJdiberate Caution: School fntef.{ration in Seattle, 
1 g54-1 g68, 7:3 I' A C. NOI!THWI•;ST Q. 50, 50 (1982). 
115. Quintard Taylor, The Ciuil Riuhts Moucment in the American West: mach 
l'rotest in Seattle, 1.96"().}g70, 80 The .J. NECIW HIST. 1, ;3 (199fi). 
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were even more obvious in the city's high schools; six of eleven 
high schools enrolled five or less Black students each.lHi The 
racial make-up of Seattle's public schools reflected segregated 
housing pHtterns in the city. 117 
Seattle is divided east to west by the Lake Washington Ship 
Canal, which connects Seattle's Lake Washington to Puget 
Sound. In addition to providing passage to vessels, the Ship 
Canal also acts as a geographic boundary which some refer to 
as the city's "Mason-Dixon" line, a border between the mostly 
white neighborhoods in the north and the ethnic minority 
neighborhoods in the central and southern area of the city.118 
Housing discrimination in Seattle made the Ship Canal a racial 
dividing line.ll9 These housing patterns continue in Seattle 
today, as a majority of white residents reside "in the northern, 
historically more affluent end of the city," and a majority of 
Black, Asian, Hispanic and Native American residents live in 
the southern area of the city.120 
Segregation in Seattle, reflected in the racial make-up of 
Seattle public schools, resulted from discriminatory housing 
practices in the city. Until 1968, it was legal to discriminate 
against minorities when renting or selling real estate in 
Seattle.121 The enforcement of restrictive covenants in Seattle, 
and other discriminatory acts, like realtors refusing to show 
houses in certain neighborhoods to people of color and red-
lining by banks (denying credit to minorities), confined Black 
residents to the central area of Seattle.122 In 1961, the Seattle 
11 6. .Judge, supra note 1 I il. 
117. !d. 
111'. !d. Sec also Laura Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for 
School lksl!h'Tl:gation in Seattle and the Nation 25 (Mar. 199()) (unpublished article for 
tlw University of Washington, Seattle, Institute for Public Policy and Management, 
Program on lk-inventing Public Education), available at 
http://www.l:ric.ed.gov/I'D FS/ED118197.pdf. 





120. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents lnuolued 
f), 1:37 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
121. The Seattle Open Housing Campaign, 1.959-1968, SEATTLIU)OV. 
http://www .cityofsea Ule .net/cityarchiveslexh ibits/openhous/ default .htm (last visited 
May lH, 2012). 
122. /d. 
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branch of the NAACP requested the passage of an ordinance 
prohibiting housing discrimination, which representatives of 
the Seattle Real Estate Board and Seattle Apartment 
Operators' Association opposed.123 In 1962, the Mayor and City 
Council refused to support an anti-discrimination housing 
ordinance, against the recommendation of the Mayor's Citizen's 
Advisory Committee on Minority Housing.l24 
In response to the City Council's inaction to ending housing 
discrimination, Philip L. Burton, on behalf of the Seattle 
branch of the NAACP, filed suit against the Seattle School 
Board to desegregate the district's schools.125 The School Board 
and NAACP settled out of court in 1963 because the School 
Board adopted a program allowing students to voluntarily 
transfer between schools.126 However, the district did not 
provide transportation for students who wished to transfer, so 
few students of color transferred to schools in the northern part 
of the city.127 Even fewer white students chose to transfer to 
schools south of the Ship Canal.J28 The same year, the Seattle 
Human Hights Commission129 drafted an open housing 
ordinance, which the City Council declined to pass.1:3o Instead, 
the City Council placed the open housing ordinance on the 
ballot for a March 1964 vote, where the ordinance was defeated 
by a vote of 115,627 to 54,448.131 
Frustrated by the failure of efforts to end legalized housing 
discrimination, the NAACP supported a 1966 boycott of 
Seattle's Central Area schools to protest continued school 
segregation.1:32 Housing discrimination in Seattle continued to 
12:l. !d. 
124. !d. 
125. Mary T. Henry, NAACJ' Seattle Branch, HISTORYLINK.ow; (.Jan. 1-1, 1999), 
http :1 /www .historyli nk.org/i ndex.cfm? Dis pi ay I 'age=ou t.pu t.cfm & File I d=G95. 
126. ,Judge, supra note 11 a. See also Kohn, supra notl' 118, at 24 ("The voluntary 
measures entailed allowing or encouraging transfers between schools within the 
district through program placement and magnet schools."). 
127. !d.; Tate, supra note 119. 
128. Jd.; Tate, supra note 119. 
129. The Seattle Open /lousing Campaign, supra note 121 (Tiw Seattle Human 
Rights Commission was created after .July 196il protests and a sit-in at the Mayor's 
office. The protests were held to bring attention to the Mayor and City Council's 
inaction in passing anti-discrimination housing legislation). 
1 ilO. /d. 
1 :n. !d. (Opponents of the ordinance elaimed it violated their property rights as 
"forced housing" legislation). See also Pieroth, supra note 111. at 51. 
I :l2. Henry, supra note 125. See also l'ieroth, supra note 114, at 5G. 
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be legal until April 19, 1968, just three weeks after Martin 
Luther King Jr. was assassinated.1:1:1 An open housing 
ordinance was passed unanimously by the City Council, and 
was signed by the Mayor.l31 While the 1968 open housing 
ordinance was an important and necessary piece of Civil Rights 
legislation in Seattle, it could not undo the prior decades of 
housing discrimination that created a highly segregated school 
system. 
B. The Seattle Plan for Desegregation 
In the 1960s, Seattle's school hoard began enacting 
measures to create "diverse and equal educational 
opportunities" for all students in the district, instead of relying 
solely on neighborhood school assignments that would replicate 
the racial make-up of segregated housing patterns in the 
city.l:'lfi While the Seattle School District was never subject to 
court ordered desegregation plans, lawsuits were initiated 
against the district.l36 At the point of each potential suit, the 
district implemented desegregation plans in order to avoid 
litigationYl7 In 1977, another threat of litigation by the Seattle 
branch of the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
the Church Council of Greater Seattle prompted the school 
board to adopt the Seattle Plan for desegregation.l:i8 The 
Seattle Plan was a busing program that paired schools in 
minority areas of the city with schools in white areas of the city 
and "designated one school for grades 1-2 and the other for 
grades 3-5."1:19 The school board approved the plan in a six to 
one vote, and in 1978 became the largest American city to 
voluntarily adopt efforts to desegregate through mandatory 
busing.l40 
1:n. The Seattle Open Housing Campaign, supra note 121. 
1:11. /d. 
1 :l5. l'arents Involved I, 1 :n F. Supp. 2d at 122fi. 
1 :Hi. Kohn, supra note 11 S, at 22. 
J:l7. /d. ("These compromisl's testify to both the potential strength of the casl' and 
the desire on thl' part of the school board for the political cover of a threatl'm'd law suit 
on which they could blame their aetions."). 
1 :ls. !d. at 25. 
1:39. ld. 
110. Tate. supra note 119. 
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Backlash occurred immediately after the Seattle Plan was 
implemented, in the form of an anti-busing initiative sponsored 
by the Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee.l41 The 
initiative passed with 61%) of the city's voters in 1978.142 
During the first year of the mandatory busing plan, the 
percentage of white students enrolled in the District's schools 
dropped by 12%.14:3 The District created gifted student 
programs and other option programs aimed to appeal to 
middle-class parents in response to this "white flight."l44 This 
solution was not entirely successful, as white students were the 
primary participants in the option programs, creating 
segregated classrooms in technically integrated schools.l45 The 
United States Supreme Court declared the anti-busing 
initiative unconstitutional in a 1982 opinion, but support for 
mandatory district wide busing was limited.l46 
C. The Controlled Choice Plan 
By the late 1980s, the Seattle busing plan continued to be a 
source of contention and debate.l47 At first, critics of 
mandatory busing were primarily white parents who wanted 
their children to attend schools in their homogeneous 
neighborhoods.148 However, criticism of the busing program 
expanded to include Black parents and white liberals who 
initially supported the busing plan.149 Critics of the busing 
plan were concerned that it unfairly burdened children of color, 
created circumstances in which some schools under-enrolled 
and others over-enrolled, and was too costly.l50 In 1988, the 
Seattle School Board responded to mounting criticism and 
introduced a "controlled choice" plan, which allowed parents to 
select schools for their children "from within a prescribed 
cluster of schools-as long as their choice maintained racial 
111. Kohn, supra note 118, at 25. 
112. Tate, supra note 119. 
11\:l. /d. 
111. !d. (The numher of schools offering "option" programs to appeal to middle-






150. Kohn, supra note 118, at 2G. 
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balance."lfl I The plan allowed parents to rank their preferred 
schools, but the district gave preference "to students whose 
race would help create racial balance in schools."! 52 
By 1995, one of the most vocal critics of mandatory busing 
was John H. Stanford, the first Black Superintendent of Seattle 
Schools who served from 1995 until his untimely death in 
1998.15:l In 1995, Stanford addressed the School Board with 
findings from a study of mandatory busing, citing that more 
minority children were bused than white children, and 
claiming that children who were bused performed worst in 
school, regardless of their race or economic status.l54 Under 
Stanford's leadership, the Seattle School Board ended 
mandatory busing and voted unanimously in November 1996 
for a plan to increase student enrollment in neighborhood 
schools.lf>5 
D. Seattle's Tie Breaker System for High School Assignments 
After the end of mandatory busing in Seattle in 1997, the 
district sought to encourage voluntary integration by offering 
programs attractive to students and parents, as a means to 
151. Tate. supra note 119. 
!52. San jay Bhatt, Seattle Tradition of School Choice Faces Ax, SEATTLI•: TIMES, 
:vlay 9, 2005, at B 1. available at 
h ttp:l I sPa ttkti mes. n wsou rce. co m/h tm 1/loca I news/20022()11211_ choicc09m. h tm I. 
15:l. do layne Houtz pt al., "/ /Jon't Want the Kids to (iuit "-John Stanford, A Voice 
for Children, /Jies, Seattle Times, Nov. 29 19911, 
http://comm unity.sea ttleti mes. nwsource.com/archivel?date= 19911 1129&slug=27116078. 
See also Tate, supra note 119 (A former Army generaL Stanford took thP position of 
SupPrintendent without any prior expl'rience in the field of l'ducation. HP was one of 
fl'W supPrintendents without a background in education.). 
151. Dick Lilly, Minorities Hurt Most by Busing, Says Seattle Study-Change in 
Neighborhood Related to /~ower Test Scores, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at Ill. 
auailablc at 
http://community.seatt]l,times.nwsource.com/archive/?date=199f> 11 02&slug=2150:l1 :-1. 
(Stanford's findings included reading scores on standardized tests for low-incoml' 
elPml'ntary school studPnts. which were 5 percl'ntage points higher f(>r students in 
neighborhood schools when compared to students who were bused to schools outside 
thl,ir nPighborhoods. 11192 minority students were bused from South Seat til' to North 
Seattle but only 197 white students werP bused from North Seattle to South SeattlP 
(more minority students complied with mandatory busing than whitP students). 
However, this correlation hardly shows causation). 
155. Dick Lilly, Seattle to J•;nd Busing-School noard /Jrops Racc-13ascd System, 
SEATTLE TII\H;s, Nov. 21, 1996, at A1, available at 
http://community.sPattletimes.nwsource.eom/archivPI?datP=19961121 &slug=2:H11 019. 
472 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
equalize the attractiveness of the district's ten high schools.l56 
However, there were still large discrepancies in the desirability 
between the schools.l57 In the 2000-2001 school year, five of the 
ten high schools-Ballard, Nathan Hale, Roosevelt, Garfield 
and Franklin-were oversubscribed, meaning there were not 
enough spaces to accommodate all of the students who ranked 
the school as their first choice.158 Eighty-two percent of the 
district's students selected one of the five oversubscribed 
schools as their first choice, and only eighteen percent picked 
one of the other five schools as their first choice.l59 To combat 
the issue of oversubscription, the district employed a series of 
four tiebreakers to determine student assignments.l60 
The first step in the district's tiebreaker was sibling 
preference; if the student had a sibling already enrolled at the 
school, they were granted admission.l61 The second tiebreaker 
depended on the school's racial composition.162 Seattle 
classified students as either white (comprising 41 %) of the 
district's students) or nonwhite (59% of the district's students, 
which include all other racial groups).16:1 Seattle's plan deemed 
a school "integration positive" if its student composition was 
not within ten percentage points of the district's overall 41%) 
white, 59% nonwhite balance.l64 For an "integration positive" 
school, the district's second tiebreaker selected students whose 
race served "to bring the school into balance."165 The third tie 
breaker concerned geographic proximity of the school to the 
student's residence, admitting the closest students first.lGG The 
fourth tiebreaker was a lottery to assign any remaining seats, 
but the lottery was virtually never used because the geographic 
15G. Parents Involved in Cmty. Seh. v. Seattle: Seh. Dist. No 1 (Parents lnuolu!'d 





Hil. Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 711-712; Parents Involved III, 12G F.:ld at 
11()9 (The sibling tiebreaker detc:rmined between 15 and 20 perel,nt of the student 
assignments for 91h grade: studc:nts.). 
1G2. Parentslnvolued IV, 551 U.S. at 712. 
1 G:cl. /d. 
1G1. /d. 
!G5. /d. 
1 GG. /d.; Parents lnuolucd Ill, ·126 F.:kl at 1171 (The geohrraphie tidm,aker 
assigned 70-7.5'/(, of ninth grade admissions.). 
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tiebreaker assigned nearly all of the district's students. Hi7 
ln the 2000-2001 school year only four oversubscribed high 
schools-Ballard, Franklin, Roosevelt, and Nathan Hale-were 
integrntion positive, meaning the enrollment of white students 
in the previous school year was greater than 51%.168 Overall, 
more nonwhites than whites received placement m 
oversubscribed integration positive schools.l69 Only 307 
students were affected by the racial tiebreaker; 170 209 of these 
students were assigned to a school that was one of their 
choices, and only 52 students were ultimately assigned to a 
school they had not listed as a preference and would not have 
otherwise been assigned.! 71 
Kathleen Brose, the President of Parents Involved in 
Community Schools, wanted her daughter Elizabeth to attend 
Ballard, but she was assigned to her fourth choice school, 
Franklin.172 Kathleen stated, "[Elizabeth] was told basically, 
'You have no value to us, except your skin color. We don't care 
if it's going to be a burden to have you get on that school bus 
every day."'l n Kathleen felt "absolutely betrayed" 174 that her 
child was denied admission to her first three ranked schools, 
and this was the catalyst behind Parents Involved. 
E. Washington State's Anti-Affirmative Action Law 
That Elizabeth Brose was simply denied her first choice in 
schools does not seem like a plausible discrimination claim. 
However, her mother stated, "It's wrong. It's illegal. To me, it's 
immoral. This is the United States. We do not discriminate."175 
]()7. /d. 
16H. !d. 
]()9. !d. (Absent the tiebreaker: 107 more white students were assigned to 
Ballard; t\9 more whitt> stud('nts W(,re assigned to Franklin; 82 mon• nonwhite students 
wen• assigned to Roosevelt; and 27 more nonwhite students were assigned to Nathan 
Hale.). 
170. l'arcnts Inuolucd IV, 561 U.S. at 711-712. 
171. !d. at 7:l:l-:H. 
172. Kathleen's Story, l'AHENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS. 
http://www.piics.org/pagt>9.html (last visited May 18, 2012). 
17:). f'BS Ncwshour: Supreme Court Reuisits Race in l'ublic Schools (PBS 
te](,vision broadcast Dec. 1, 2006), auailablc at 
http :1 lwww. pbs. org/n ('wshou r/bb/la w/ju ly -dec06/ scotus_12-01.htm I. 
17·1. Kathleen's Story, wpra note, 172. 
17;). f'BS Ncwshour, supra note 17:l. 
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It may appear that Kathleen Brose was conf1ating her desire to 
choose which school her daughter attended with an Equal 
Protection claim. However, Elizabeth Brose was assigned to 
Franklin High School two years after Washington State 
adopted an anti-affirmative action initiative. 
In 1998, Ward Connerly, a Black millionaire businessman 
and former University of California Regent, replicated his 
successful efforts passing California Proposition 209 with ballot 
Initiative 200 (1-200), in Washington state.l76 The text of 
Section 1 of Washington's 1-200 prohibits "state and local 
agencies from discriminating against, or granting preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting."l77 
Connerly described the text of the initiative as a way "to 
restore the principle of equal treatment for all by enacting 
[state] constitutional amendments."l78 Connerly denounces 
race-conscious policies and affirmative action programs as 
discriminatory: "Essentially, the Court suspended the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection for some citizens, 
particularly whites, in the interest of compensating blacks 
because their civil rights had been denied for many years."l79 
However, the concept of equality Connerly espouses is based in 
a reading that disregards the racialized aspects of the 
Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment. Connerly stated: 
"We translate the Constitution and other documents literally 
and we are guided by the words. 'Equal' means 'equal."'lSO In 
his interpretation of the Constitution and other documents, 
like the Declaration of Independence and the Pledge of 
Allegiance,lSl Connerly dismisses the race-conscious purpose of 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
176. Ward Connerly, One Nation, Indivisible, HOOVI.:R INSTITUTION (.Jan. :30, 
200 I), http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/71\l\ I. 
177. Hlcction: 1998 State Hallot Measures-Complete Text of Initiative 200. 
W/\SHIN<:l'ON SECRETARY OF ST/\'1'1<:, http://www.sos.wa.gov/eleetions/199H/i200.aspx 
(last visited May 18, 2012). 
17H. Ward Connerly. Achieving Equal Treatment Through the Ballot Box. :32 
HM<V. ,J.L. & PUB. Pm;y 105, 109 (2009). 
179. /d. at 108 (Connerly used the same basic languagl' of 1-200 in hallot 
initiatives in Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, California, and Michigan.). 
180. Ward Connerly, Not by Any Mmns Necessary, 11\ HUMAN. Sol'. SCI. & L,\W 
65. 66 (20(ll). 
11:\1. Sec Connerly, supra note 176; see also Connerly, supra note 171:\. 
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instead employs a literal, ahistorical interpretation. 
Connerly's primary goal is for American society to "get 
beyond race"l82 and he promotes colorblindness through 
policies and ballot initiatives like I-200 that prohibit the state 
from classifying individuals on the basis of race, arguing: "We 
must end the existing system of preferences that differentiates 
the American people on the basis of race, ethnicity, and 
gender."18:l Connerly's non-profit organization, the American 
Civil Rights Institute (ACRI), contributed hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to the I-200 campaign.184 In 1996, ACRI 
was "created to educate the public on the harms of racial and 
gender preferences" and "seeks to affect a cultural change by 
challenging the 'race matters' mentality embraced by many of 
today's so-called 'civil rights leaders."'185 Connerly and ACRI's 
efforts prevailed in Washington State when voters approved 1-
200 in November 1998 by a vote of 58(%-42<)1>.186 Connerly's 
organization and funding of I-200 are notable examples of a 
political activist promoting anti -classification principles and 
portraying the use of race-conscious policies as morally and 
legally wrong, 187 thereby expanding colorblindness from a legal 
doctrine and political view into a form of political discourse. 
Kathleen Drose did not vote in favor of I-200.188 Brose 
182. Connerly, supra note 180, at 71. 
18:3. Comwrly, supra note 176. 
181. David Postman, /-200 Foes Leading Battle of the Chechbooh. SEATTL!•; T!lvn;s, 
Oct. H, 1998, at A 1, available at 
http://com munity .seattlet imes. nwsource.com/archivef'ldatc>=1 9981 011 &slug=2777G:l1 
(Connerly's i\CIU contributt~d over $80,000 for "educational" television commercials 
and $128.000 for radio commercials. ACHI was bound by IRS regulations for charitabiP 
groups, which forbid advocating a position on the ballot measure, but Connerly's 
American Civil i{ights Coalition was not bound by these n•gulations and his American 
Civil!{ights Coalition also contributed $181,000.). 
185. About the American Civil Hights Institute, AM. CIV. i{Ts. lNST., 
http://www.acri.org/about.html (last visited May 18, 2012) (Connerly and Dusty 
!{bodes, a former Goldman Sachs vice-president and founder and director of the 
conservative think tank Project for the Republican Future, founded ACIU to continue 
anti-affirmative action measures following the passage of Prop 209 in California.). 
186. /Jachground on /-200, AM. CIV. ]{Ts. !NST., http://www.acri.org/l-
200_background.html (la;;t vi;;ited May 18, 2012). 
187. Ward Connerly, It:~ Time to gnd /lace-Based "Affirmative Action", 1 U. ST. 
THOIVL\S ,J.L. & PUB. l'OL'Y fin, 60 (2007) ("Treating Americans differently because of 
their 'race' or their skin color was determined to be morally and legally wrong in tlw 
first half of the twentieth century."). 
1St\. E-mail from Kathleen Bro;;e (Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with author). 
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subscribed to the anti-I-200 "hype about how it would 
discriminate against people."189 Reflecting on her vote in 1998, 
Brose described herself as "an uninformed, politically naive 
voter biased by political correctness. I was rationally 
ignorant."190 Today, Brose believes that the adoption of I-200 
has "made it more fair for everyone, not just [her] children." 191 
Brose's statements incorporate the rationales of colorblindness 
and the objectives of l-200, specifically the idea that 
distinctions made on the basis of race are an unconstitutional 
form of discrimination. 
F. The Initiation of Parents Involved in Community Schools 
Parents Involved was initiated with the active participation 
of I-200 spokespeople and the support of politically 
conservative politicians and organizations. John Carlson, the I-
200 campaign chairman, was centrally involved in organizing 
the lawsuit against the Seattle School District. The decision to 
sue the school district was based on the School Board's refusal 
in November 1999 to adopt recommendations from 
Superintendent ,Joseph Olchefske and General Counsel Mark 
Green to change assignment policies to "downplay racial 
considerations."l92 Refusing the recommendations, School 
Board President Barbara Scaad-Lamphere stated that the 
school board decided to continue to use race as one of several 
factors in student assignment policy as a signal to the district's 
"commitment to racial and cultural integration."19:1 She stated: 
"It's clear the board really values diversity in our public schools 
and feels it's an important aspect of education in Seattle."l94 
1i->9. ld. 
1\)0. ld. 
191. Id. Keith Ervin, 1-200 Backers Plannin& to Sue Seattle Schools, SEATTLI•: 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at B1, available at 
http://community .sea ttletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?da te= 19991126&slug=2997781 
(In 1999, Carlson reached out to supporters of I -200 hy email, looking f(lr children who 
had been denied admission to schools of their choice because of the racial tiebreaker. 
Carlson and the 1-200 Civil Rights Compliance Committee were seeking children and 
families to be plaintiffs in litigation to challenge Seattle School District's use of the 
racial tiebreaker as a violation of 1-200.). 
192. ld. (The recommendations were offered at the advice of district attorneys to 
help defend the school district against legal challenges by applying the racial 
tiebreaker only t.o schools whc•re the racial balance deviated more than twenty pt•rcent 
(instead of ten percent) from the district wide average.). 
19:l. ld. 
191. /d. 
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However, with support from colorblind advocates, the newly 
formed Parents Involved in Community Schools (PIICS) 
challenged the school district's commitment to integrated 
schools in court. 
The Sacramento-based Pacific Legal Foundation, a 
conservative public interest law firm, developed many of the 
arguments utilized by counsel for PIICS.l95 The Pacific Legal 
Foundation is "devoted to a vision of individual freedom, 
responsible government, and color-blind justicc."l96 The Pacific 
Legal Foundation actively assisted Kathleen Brose and PIICS 
throughout the litigation. They provided training for Kathleen, 
as spokesperson for PIICS, on how to conduct herself in front of 
national media, instructing her how to stay "on task with the 
sound bite, 'We arc not against diversity, we are against 
discrimination."'l97 John Carlson also provided a forum for 
PIICS to promote its message on his conservative radio show, a 
tactic similar to the approach he took when promoting the 
Washington Initiative he co-authored in the early 1990s.l98 
Carlson, a spokesperson for I-200, which embraces the anti-
195. Mark Tushnet. Op. Ed., Who:q Behind the Integration Decision/ it's the 
l'acific Legal Foundation, Champion of Ri!{ht- Wing Causes for 35 Years. L.A TI1Y1!•;s, 
.July 7, 2007, at 19, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-
m•-tushnet7jul07,0,:loO:l62:).story (The Pacific Legal Foundation was creat,~d aft,~r 
.Justice: Lc:wis Powell, in 1971, wrote a memo to a friend worrying that liberal groups 
had nurtured specialist lawyers and litigation stratc:gies to defend government 
wgulation. In response, the business community help,~d create not-for-profit law firms, 
like the Pacific Legal Foundation, to argue conservative perspectives.). 
1 !'Hi. About PLF, Pac. Legal Found., 
ht tp://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=262 (last visited May 18, 2012). 
197. E-mail from Kathleen Brose (Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with author) (Kathh~en 
practiced with tlw Pacific Legal Foundation, fielding hardball practice questions. and 
filming her n•sponses on videotape.). 
198. /d. Carlson contacted Brose after the lawsuit b,•gan, invited her and another 
PIICS member to be interviewc:d on his radio show, and spoke on the phone several 
times. Carlson co-authored the 199:l Washington Initiative 59:l (commonly referred to 
as "Three Strikes, You're Out"), which sentences individuals convicted of their third 
violent felony to prison for life with no opportunity for parole, probation, or work 
release. Carlson acted as a spokesperson for his initiative through his radio show as 
wPII as his free-lance eolumn, which was featured weekly in The Seattk Times 
Newspaper editorial page. The initiative was approved by a three to one margin. Terry 
Tang, Media Ethics: The Curious /Ju.al llolc of ,John Carlson, Seattle Times, Nov. 9. 
199:l. auailable at 
http://eommunity.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/'ldate=199:ll1 09&slug=17:i0761; 
Daniel W. Stiller, Initiative 593: Washin!{ton's Voters Uo /)own 8win!{ing, ;)() GONZ. L. 
i{EV. 1:J:l (1991-95). 
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classification principles of colorblindness and the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, whose mission statement proclaims their 
dedication to color blindness, 199 contributed to the formulation 
and development of PIICS' case, thereby promoting 
colorblindness in the political and judicial domains. 
PllCS brought suit in Federal Court on June 18, 2000 
claiming the District's use of the second tiebreaker to maintain 
racial balance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and the Washington Civil Rights Act (I-200).200 Between 
2001 and 2006, the Washington Supreme Court and four 
Federal Courts heard Parents Involved prior to the Supreme 
Court's grant of certiorari. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT PROMOTED COLORBLINDNESS IN 
PARENTS INVOLVED 
Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opmwn in Parents 
Involved, which Justices Thomas, Scalia and Alita joined, 
further promotes colorblindness as the preferred approach in 
evaluating race-conscious policies, and severely restricts racial 
integration as a compelling government interest. The plurality 
opinion overlooked the depth of the Seattle story and 
determined the case relying on anti-classification principles, 
thereby promoting a colorblind framework in assessing the 
constitutionality of race-conscious remedies in the secondary 
school context.201 
A. Justice Roberts' Plurality Opinion 
Rachel Moran, Dean of UCLA Law School and Education 
Law scholar, observes that the holding in Brown means either 
that strict colorblindness is a constitutional requirement or 
that flexible color-consciousness is necessary to achieve racial 
justice.202 Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, embraces 
199. About Pl~F. supra note 196. 
200. Parents lnuolved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27. 
201. The~ Supreme Court granted certionn·i and heard Parents lnuolved with a 
companion case. Meredith v. Jefferson County 13oard of Education in 2006. Notably. 
there was no circuit split on issues of voluntary intL~gration plans prompting the Court 
to grant certiorari. Perhaps the Court objected to the reasoning of the Circuit courts 
and granted certiorari in order to rectify the Circuit court decisions. 
202. Rachel F. Moran, llcthinhinf{ /lace, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled 
l'romise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1:l21, J:i22 (2008). 
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the former by reading the Equal Protection Clause as though it 
is a part of a colorblind Constitution. The plurality concluded 
school districts may not voluntarily undertake integration 
efforts that are not in specific response to remedying legal 
segregation, ignoring the social reality of the continuing effects 
of historical segregation and racism. 
The attorneys for PIICS framed their petition for certiorari 
specifically within the context of Grutter v. Bollinger.203 Dean 
Moran notes that until Parents Involved, elementary and 
secondary school desegregation cases utilized a separate logic, 
distinct from cases considering affirmative action in higher 
education.204 The petitioner's brief invoked the rhetoric of 
colorblindness, inviting judicial analysis along an anti-
classification framework: "Any racial classification, any 
government entity, is presumptively invalid and must 
suhjt'ctcd to the strictest judicial scrutiny ... the District's 
program ... violates the heart of the !<~qual Protection 
the principle that our Constitution is eolor-blind."205 Justice 
Roberts first agrees with petitioners that strict scrutiny is the 
proper standard of review for race-conscious school assignment 
policies, stating "the school districts must demonstrate that 
their use of such classifications is 'narrowly tailored' to achieve 
a 'compelling' government interest."206 
The plurality looked to whether the school district as a 
state actor has a compelling interest for utilizing the racial 
tiebreaker. Citing Milliken, Hoberts stated that while a 
compelling interest exists in "remedying the effects of past 
2Cl:l. Initial Brief for the Appellant-Petitioner at i, Pan,nts Involved in Cmty. Sch. 
v. Seatt!P Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908), 200G WL 2152:l7·1 ("(1) 
How arc• the Equal Protection rights of puhlic high school students affected by the' 
jurisprurknce of Grutter u. Bollinger . .. ? (2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest 
that ean justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high 
schools? (:l) May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally 
permits a studPnt to attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to 
lu~r chosen school solt~ly bt~cause of her race in an eff(>rt to achieve a desired racial 
balance between whites and nonwhites in particular schools, or does such racial 
balancing violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?"). 
20,1. Moran, supra note 202, at 1:322 (noting that the petitioner's questioned 
whether the voluntary desegregation plans in Louisville and Seattle could hP upheld 
under tht' wquirements of Oruttcr). 
20fi. Initial Brief for the Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 20:l, at 21, 
20G. Parents lnuolued IV, 551 U.S. at 702. 
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intentional discrimination," the Seattle public schools were 
never segregated by law, so any use of race "must be justified 
on some other basis."207 Absent from Roberts' opinion is a 
recognition of the reality of segregation in Seattle, established 
through a system of legalized housing discrimination until 
1968. Additionally, Roberts' opinion, unlike Justice Breyer's 
dissent, contains no discussion of NAACP lawsuits in the 1960s 
and 70s alleging the Seattle School Board acted to segregate 
schools, which were settled when the School Board vowed to 
undertake a mandatory desegregation plan.208 Roberts adopted 
what Alan Freeman refers to as the "perpetrator" perspective 
in his insistence that voluntary race conscious integration 
plans may only be utilized to remedy past intentional 
discrimination.209 From the "perpetrator" perspective, one only 
recognizes "the actions of identifiable perpetrators who have 
purposely and intentionally caused harm to identifiable victims 
who will be offered a compensatory remedy."210 The 
perpetrator perspective refuses to find "violations of 
antidiscrimination law in objective social conditions" like the 
patterns of housing segregation in Seattle. Roberts adopted 
this perspective in insisting that de facto segregation in Seattle 
was not a form of identifiable discrimination and therefore not 
a compelling interest that may be remedied by voluntary 
integration efforts, like those of the Seattle School District.211 
Roberts described a second compelling government interest 
under strict scrutiny as diversity in higher education, citing 
Grutter.212 Roberts summarized interests of diversity from 
Grutter as extending only to "highly individualized, holistic 
review" of individuals, not as members of a racial group.21:3 
207. !d. at 720-21. 
208. Id. at 808-10. (Breyer, .J., disstmting) ("'n 1966, the NAACP filed a federal 
lawsuit against the school board, claiming the board had 'unlawfully and 
unconstitutionally' 'establish[edJ' and 'maintain[ed]' a system of 'racially segregatt>d 
schools.' ... The board responded to the lawsuit by introducing a plan that required 
race-based transfers and mandatory busing .... In 1977, the NAACP filed another 
legal complaint. . . [tbatj alleged that the Seattle School Board had created or 
perpetuated unlawful racial segregation .... The school hoard entered into a formal 
settlenwnt agreement. The agn,emtmt required the hoard to implement what became 
known as the 'Seattle Plan."'). 
209. Freeman, supra note 85, at 1112. See also Powell, supra note 7, at :l8:l. 
210. Freeman, supra note 85, at 1112. 
211. /d. See also Powell, supra note 7, at :38:3. 
212. Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 722. 
2 n /d. at 72:l (quoting Grutter V. Bollinger, G:l9 u.S. :lOG, :l:J7 (200:l)). 
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Roberts concluded the racial tiebreaker did not fit the 
individualized and holistic review required by Grutter.2l4 He 
stated that the purpose of using racial classifications is only 
considered n:1rrow tailoring when it is utilized as one piece of 
assessing diversity, and that using race as a means to achieve 
racial balance would be "patently unconstitutional."215 Roberts 
defined the racial tiebreaker as the only factor considered, 
concluding: "[T]he racial classifications employed by the 
districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the 
educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial 
diversity."216 In doing so, Roberts utilized the concept of 
diversity to exclude race or color consciousness policies. 
Roberts rejected any other compelling interest and 
described the dangers of allowing racial balancing as a 
compelling interest, alleging that doing so would "effectively 
assure that race will always be relevant in American life, and 
that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminating entirely from 
governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a 
human being's race' will never be achieved."217 But Roberts' 
assertion that race should not be relevant in American life is a 
rejection of a color-conscious Equal Protection Clause, and 
ignores the social realities of America, in which race certainly 
continues to be an important factor. Roberts ends his opinion 
stating: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is 
to stop discriminating on the basis of race."2lil 
The central problem with Roberts' reasoning is that simply 
identifying students on the basis of their race, with the 
intention of remedying the effects of historical and social 
racism, is not a form of discrimination. Further, strict scrutiny 
was not the appropriate test. Rather, strict scrutiny should 
only be used for racial classifications that harmfully exclude, 
not for racial classifications designed to include, like the 
Seattle integration plan. The Seattle plan did not confer certain 
21:1. /d. ("In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considerc'd as part of a 
broackr effort. ... It. is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a 
decision. as in Grutter; it is the factor."). 
215. /d. (quoting Gruttcr, 5:39 U.S. at :J:lO). 
2H1. !d. at 726. 
217. /d. at 7:10 (citing City of Richmond v. ,J.i\. Croson Co., :188 U.S. 169, :195 
(1989) (O'Connor, plurality opinion)) (internal citations omitted). 
21H. /d. at 718. 
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benefits solely on the basis of race. It was simply one of four 
tiebreakers used to determine school assignments, seeking to 
rectify persistent racial divisions and inequalities. But by 
framing the question of Parents Involved within the precedent 
of Grutter, the Court considered the racial tiebreaker within 
the context of diversity-which was a distraction from an 
explicit discourse about racial disparities and suitable remedies 
that consider historical and social context in an effort toward 
inclusiveness. 
B. Justice Thomas' Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas similarly relied upon 
the fallacy "of a colorblind constitution" as the "essence of 
Brown's legacy,"219 and rejected concerns about remedying 
social inequalities. He dismissed concerns of re-segregation in 
Seattle's schools and stated: "Racial imbalance Is not 
segregation, and the mere incantation of terms like 
resegregation and remediation cannot make up the 
difference."220 Thomas also stated: "[R]acial imbalance can also 
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including 
voluntary housing choices" and reasoned that "racial imbalance 
is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, it is not 
unconstitutional .... "221 
Thomas disregards the historical fact that many of the 
housing "choices" made by residents of Seattle in the 20th 
Century were subject to legalized housing discrimination 
policies, and that subsequent separation along race in Seattle's 
schools was the direct result of this government sanctioned 
discrimination. Thomas bolsters the idea of a colorblind 
constitution stating his view of the Constitution as that of 
,Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson: "Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens." Thomas' uses Harlan's words in a fundamentally 
different way than originally employed by Justice Harlan.222 In 
219. Moran, supra note 202, at 1 i)27. 
220. Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 719. 
221. ld. at 750. 
222. l'lessy v. Ferguson, Hiil U.S. 5:37, 559 (1896) (Harlan, .J., dissenting) ("The 
white race deems itself to be the dominant racl' in this country. i\.nd so it is, in prestige. 
in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue 
to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principll's 
of constitutionallihl'rty. But in view of the constituition, in the eye of the law, then' is 
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Plessy, the majority asserted that race has no social meaning in 
order to find that the requirement of segregated train cars was 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.223 Harlan's 
dissent was a call to recognize the role of race in the 
subjugation of Black Americans, not to make claim that race-
conscious government remedies are unconstitutional.224 
Thomas' distortion of Harlan's dissent is in furtherance of the 
colorblind perspective adopted by the Court. 
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence 
While Justice Kennedy disagreed with the dissent's 
determination that the school districts "identified a compelling 
interest in increasing diversity, including for the purpose of 
avoiding racial isolation,"225 Kennedy refrained from joining 
parts of the plurality opmwn because Roberts did not 
acknowledge that diversity "is a compelling educational goal a 
school district may pursue."226 Kennedy recognized diversity as 
a compelling governmental interest, but determined the Seattle 
School District's assignment policy was unconstitutional 
because it failed to pass strict scrutiny.227 Kennedy reasoned 
that the district's policy was not narrowly tailored because it 
failed to explain why students from many ethnic backgrounds 
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. Then~ is no caste here. 
Our constitution is color-blind. and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens .... It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of 
the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a 
statl' to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solldy upon the basis of 
race."). 
22:3. Cheryl I. Harris, In thl' Shadow of Plcssy, 7 U. i'A .• J. CO:-.JST. L. i-\67, H97-9H 
(2005). 
221. l'lessy. 16:3 U.S. at 559-60 (Harlan .• J., dissenting) ("Descendants of Africans 
who Wl~re imported into this country, and sold as slaves, wen' not. inclurled nor 
intl•mkd to be included under the word 'citizens' in thl' constitution .... The n~cent 
amPndnwnts of tlw constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles from 
our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the states, a dominant race.-
a superior class of citizens,- which assumes to regulate the enjoyml,nt of civil rights, 
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race."). 
225. Parents lnuolued IV, 551 U.S. at 78:3. 
226. !d. 
227. !d. at 787 (to pass strict scrutiny the school district must. demonstrate their 
use of racial classifications is "narrowly tailon~d" to achieve a "compelling" government 
intl,rest). 
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were classified only as either "white" or "non-white."228 
Kennedy concluded that school districts may utilize "individual 
racial classifications . . . only if they are a last resort"229 
employed to foster racial diversity in schools. 
Kennedy suggested that local school districts were most 
qualified to determine how best to reach the compelling 
interest of diversity,280 and should use race-neutral measures 
in order to achieve a cross section of racially diverse students-
not because of a commitment to equal educational opportunity, 
but rather, because schools may "encourage a diverse student 
body, one aspect of which is its racial composition."2:11 Kennedy 
stated: "The decision today should not prevent school districts 
from continuing the important work of bringing together 
students of different racial, ethnic, and econom1c 
backgrounds."2:12 
Specifically, Kennedy encouraged school districts to use 
race-conscwus measures that do not treat each student 
differently on the basis of race, such as "ls]trategic site 
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with 
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; 
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students 
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race."23:1 
Because these methods do not classify and treat students 
differently on the basis of race, Kennedy asserted that it would 
be "unlikely any of them [the methods] would demand strict 
scrutiny to be found permissible."284 
Thus, Kennedy's concurrence offers school districts devoted 
to promoting diversity general suggestions of how to proceed, 
that is to implement generally race-conscious methods, and to 
exhaust all race-neutral school assignment policies before 
resorting to race-conscious measures. 
22H. /d. at 7H7. 
229. ld. at 790. 
2:30. /d. at 798 (Kennedy, .J., concurring) ("Those entrusted with directing our 
public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts. parents, administrators, and 
other concerned citizens to find a way to achil,ve thl' compelling interests they face 
without resorting to widespread governnwntal allocation of benefits and burdens on 
the basis of racial classifications."). 
231. !d. at 78tl. 
2:l2. /d. at 79H. 
2:l:l. /d. at 789. 
2:J!I. ld. 
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D. Justice Breyer's Dissent 
Justice Breyer's dissent, which Justices Stevens, Souter 
and Ginsburg joined, rejected the plurality's colorblind 
approach, and insisted that the Constitution allows school 
districts to enact policies specifically with race in mind.2:l5 He 
stated: "[WJe have understood that the Constitution permits 
local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it 
does not require them to do so."2:1G Breyer insisted that the 
purpose of Brown and its progeny were to compel desegregation 
as a means to correct past racial injustice, and also to permit 
voluntary systems that promote diversity and encourage racial 
integration.2:i7 
Furthermore, Breyer criticized the plurality's rejection of 
social conditions and prior school desegregation precedent, 
stating: "The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to 
past opinions' rationales, their language, and the contexts in 
which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and reaches the 
wrong conclusion."2:lR Breyer declared the historical and factual 
context of these cases is critical, citing that the Supreme Court 
ordered many school districts in post-Brown cases to utilize 
race-conscious practices in order to desegregate, and further, 
the Court trusted local communities with the responsibility to 
determine the best measures for achieving such integration in 
their schools.289 
Breyer then argued both the Court and school districts 
should be concerned about resegregation of public schools, 
noting "progress has stalled" toward racial integration.210 
Breryer utilizing extensive statistical data to demonstrate the 
social reality of resegregation in schools; for example, that one 
in six Black children attend a school with a student body that 
2:lG. /d. at tlOG ("[TJhe Constitution cannot plausibly be interpret(,d to rule out 
categorically all local dforts to US(' means that are "conscious" of the raet' of 
individuals."). 
2:16. /d. at k(J:l. 
2:!7. /d. at SG-1 ("Since this Court's d(,cision in Hrown, the law has consistently 
and unequivocally approved of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures 
to combat segregated schools."). 
2:lk. ld. at kO:l. 
2:l9. ld. at k01. 
210. /d. at 805. 
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is nearly 100%1 minority.241 Breyer looked to the history of 
Seattle, and specifically noted that segregation claims were 
filed against Seattle, and that a segregation complaint was 
filed with federal OCR, but the district settled, promising to 
enact a desegregation plan.242 The tiebreaker method grew 
from these remedial efforts.24:3 Breyer's dissent correctly 
identified the importance of social realities in Seattle, where 
housing segregation led to de facto school segregation, and that 
the voluntary efforts of Seattle school district to remedy these 
social inequalities were constitutional. 
Justice Breyer's dissent accurately identified the ways in 
which the plurality subverted the purpose of Brown-to 
provide integrated schools for American children-by 
discarding precedent, rejecting historically relevant conditions 
of inequality, and the societal realities of Seattle and other 
urban cities. The Court's decision in Parents Involved has 
restricted the ability for local school boards to voluntarily 
undertake race-conscious integration plans, altering the school 
compositions in Seattle and elsewhere. 
IV. TEN YEARS AFTER ABANDONING THE RACIAL-TIEBREAKER: 
HOW SEATTLE CAN CULTIVATE INTEGRATED SCHOOLS 
In the wake of Parents Involved, school districts nationwide 
are faced with the difficult task of avoiding race-conscious 
measures in promoting school assignment programs and are 
limited to the compelling government interest of "diversity" 
rather than integration. Public sentiment is adopting what the 
Supreme Court has insisted-that colorblindness is the 
appropriate guide in equal protection jurisprudence. In the 
decade since the Parents Involved litigation began, Seattle has 
adopted race-neutral school assignment policies that have 
resulted in less racially-integrated schools compared to those 
under the challenged "assignment plan," including several high 
schools that are predominantly whitc.244 I suggest that the 
241. /d. at 806. 
242. /d. at 810 ("The OCR and the school board entered into a formal setth•mPnt 
agreeml'nt. The agreemlmt required the board to implement what becaml' known as 
thl' 'Seattle !'ian.'"). 
2<J:l. !d. at 1>19. 
211. HESEAHCII, EVALUATION AND i\SSI•:SSMENT/STUllENT INFOI{MATION SEilVICI•:S 
OFFin; (REi\/SISO), SEATTLE l'UBLIC SCHOOLS INlliVIllUAL SCHOOL SUMMAIOES (Dec. 
201 0). available at 
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race-neutral assignment method-although in line with the 
requirements and restrictions of the Parents Involved 
decision-perpetuates colorblindness by refusing to confront 
persistent de facto segregation and racism. Accordingly, I 
present a proposal for recovering integrated schools. 
A. Seattle's Current School Choice Plan 
The Seattle School District abandoned the racial tiebreaker 
at issue in Parents Involved after the 2001-02 school year, and 
chose not to reinstate the tiebreaker after the Ninth Circuit 
vacated its order of injunction.245 The current school 
assignment plan for Seattle, adopted for the 2010-11 school 
year, allows students and families to apply to any Seattle 
public school; however, students and families are not 
guaranteed a seat at any particular school.246 The current 
school assignment plan cites the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Parents Involved, stating that the Court "affirmed that there is 
a compelling interest in creating diverse student populations 
and that students and society at large benefit from integrated 
public schools."247 
In the current assignment process, Seattle school district 
still uses a sibling tiebreaker, granting preference to students 
with a sibling already attending their sought after school. For 
http :1 lwww. sl:a ttleschools.org/mod u I es/ g-rou ps/homepagefi I es/cms/ I Gi-l::l1 :H)/ Fi lei l)ppart 
mental%20Con tent/siso/disprof/20 1 ()/]) 1'1 Oindsch. pdf. 
2·1fi. l'an,nts Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (!'aren/s itn:nll•ed 
//). :377 F.:ld 919, 951-l (9th Cir. 20()1) ("The School District is not currently employing-
and has not since the 2001-02 school year Pmployed-the racial tiebreaker that Parents 
challPnge in this litigation .... [Wje enjoined the School District's use of thP racial 
tiebn,aker with our initial disposition of this casl'. And although Wl' vacated that 
injunction with the withdrawal of our initial opinion, the School District has 
voluntarily declined to reinstate its racial tid1reakt'r during the pendency of this 
litigation.") (intl'rnal citations omittl,d). 
216. l~nrollment Services Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SI·:/\T'I'L"; PUB. S<:H., 
http://www .sea t.tkschools.org/modules/cms/pages. phtml'?pageid= 192 :li-l2&sessionid=G I h 
h2bcb07da1b69i-laar,6i-l:l19c5cbc51#Q:lD (last visited May 1 i-l, 2012) (under the 
question, "] havl' a child who is already enrolled in SI'S. How do I change her/his school 
assignment for m'xt year'~"). 
217. Si<:/\TTLI<: PUB. S<:H., STUDENT ASSIGNJ\H:NT PLAN FAQ, fi (Nov. :l, 2009), 
http :1/www .google .com/u rl? sa=t& rct=j & q=&esrc=s&sou rce=we b&cd= 1 & wd =OC C U Q Fj 
l\l\& urI= h ttp'X.:lA '%2 J<'')-(,2 Fwww. bryan tschoo l.org'%2l•'index. ph p%:l Foption 'Y..:ll kom_ doc 
man 'X. 2Gtask '% :l Ddoc_ download %.26gid %:l D:l91 %261 te mid %:lD 156&l<i =0 K5AT 5SeJ oiji 
QKSpYWyAq&usg=AFQjCNENugktEI,EupsztzljihF02ZWVpbA. 
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high school assignments, there is no neighborhood preference-
the entire district is treated as a single region.248 High school 
assignments use lottery as a final tiebreaker to determine 
school assignment.249 Racial demographics within Seattle's 
high schools have changed drastically since 2000, the last full 
school year in which the district used the racial tiebreaker, and 
2010. 
B. Seattle Can Improve Racial Integration in its High Schools 
by Utilizing Race-Conscious Assignment Policies Both 
Generally and Individually 
I suggest a three-part method by which Seattle may seek to 
employ race-conscious assignment measures, both to create 
racially-diverse school communities and to challenge the 
Supreme Court's mandated colorblind approach to school 
assignment policies. I propose that Seattle should: 1) exhaust 
race-neutral assignment methods; 2) exhaust race-conscious 
methods that only generally classify students on the basis of 
race; and 3) implement race-conscious assignment policies that 
classify individual students on the basis of race, as necessary to 
produce truly racially-diverse schools. 
1. Exhaust race-neutral student assignment methods 
Seattle has used race-neutral high school assignments for 
the last ten years, resulting in four of its high schools being 
predominantly white or non-white.250 This race-neutral 
assignment policy has been in place long enough to determine 
that it has not achieved racially-diverse schools. The following 











Students in 2010 
67.3 
4.6* 
248. ld. (This differs from the elementary and middle school assignments, which 
usc region as a secondary tiebreaker, h>Tanting prderence to students living in the 
region of the school.). 
219. ld. (l<:ach student is given a random lottery number, and if necessary, tlw 
student's lottery number is used to determine the school assignnwnt.). 
250. SKt,TTLE l'UB. SCH., supra note 217. 
251. lei. (Data for thl) year 2000 on file with author). 
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Franklin 22.9 4.1 ** 
Ingraham 30.2 32.6 
Nathan 60.:1 57.0 
Hale 
Roosevelt 52.7 63.0 
Garfield 46.6 37.5 
Center Established in 2001 71.2 
School 
Nova NIA 74.1 
Schools in italics were oversubscribed in 2000 
Schools underlined were integration positive in 2000 
*;34 white students in a school of 7:38 total students 
**53 white students in a school of 1:301 total students 
489 
In 2010, white students in the District comprised 41.0%) of 
total students. 
In 2000, white students in the District comprised 40.0% of 
total students. 
Ten years after the district's abandonment of the racial-
tiebreaker in 2000, schools like Ballard, Ingraham, and Nathan 
Hale show moderate changes in the percentage of white 
student enrollment in 2010. These three high schools are all 
located in the northern area of Seattle, and in neighborhoods 
that are predominantly white.252 Conversely, in 2010, schools 
like Cleveland and Franklin, both located in southern 
Seattle,25:3 had white enrollment of less than 6%1, even though 
the district's white student population comprised 41% of its 
total students. 
Center School and Nova were not included in the district's 
demographic information for 2000. In 2010, both schools served 
a white student population comprised of over 7or!1l white 
students, when the school district's total composition included 
only 4B1l white students. Author Jonathan Kozol criticized 
Center School, founded in 2001, as an example of racial 
disparities in public schools, noting the school "attracted an 83 
252. l'arents lnuolued IV, 551 U.i:l. at 712. 
25:l. !d. at 712-1:!. 
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percent white enrollment when it opened in 2001, in a city 
where whites are only 40 percent of high school students 
district wide" whereas the Black student enrollment "was a 
meager 6 percent, although black children represent nearly a 
quarter of enrollment in the district."254 Kozol explained the 
Center School "was started at the pressure of white families 
from the city's affluent Queen Anne and Magnolia 
neighborhoods who were also in the leadership" of PIICS.255 He 
describes the creation of Center School as "a way of giving 
something that they wanted to white parents, primarily in the 
Queen Anne and Magnolia neighborhoods, whose children 
could not always get into Ballard High School under the tie-
breaker."256 
The disparities in white student enrollment at Cleveland 
and Franklin high schools compared to Center School and Nova 
are illustrative of how the race-neutral high school assignment 
policies currently employed in Seattle have failed to create 
diverse high school populations, accurately resembling the 
racial make-up of the district's total student population. Before 
adopting race-conscious policies classifying individual students 
on the basis of race and creating school assignments on the 
basis of race, Seattle will likely have to exhaust other race-
neutral methods.257 Such policies might include a general 
lottery for high school assignments in which race is not 
considered, or a randomized student-to-school assignment 
system. However, instituting a lottery or random assignment 
policy would be a significant departure from the school choice 
plans utilized in Seattle since the introduction of the first 
"controlled choice" plan in 1988. 
Seattle's current race-neutral high school assignment plan 
has failed to produce racially diverse schools. The District 
would likely need to implement other race-neutral policies as 
well as generally race-conscious policies before enacting race-
conscious policies that assign individual students to schools on 
the basis of race. 
251. JONATHAN KOZOL, Tm: SHAM I•: <H' THE NATION, 278 (2005). 
255. /d. at 277-78. 
256. ld. at 278. 
257. l'arents Involved IV. 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, .J., concurring) ("Measures 
other than difft,rential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first. must 1)(, 
exhaust.t,d. "). 
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2. Exhaust all race-conscious efforts that address the prohlcm 
general~v 
Prior to implementing race-conscious methods that classify 
individual students and treat them differently on the basis of 
race, Seattle School District must first seek to exhaust all race-
conscious efforts to promote diverse school populations in a 
general manner. In his concurrence in Parents Involved IV, 
Justice Kennedy stated: 
If school authorities are concerned that student-body 
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of 
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their 
students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to 
address the problem in a general way and without treating 
each student in a different fashion solely on the basis of a 
systematic, individual typing by race.2fi8 
Kennedy's concurrence specifically suggests school districts 
allocate "resources for special programs" to "bring[] together 
students of diverse backgrounds and races" through race-
neutral means.259 Generally, race-conscious efforts undertaken 
by the Seattle School District used to include creating gifted 
student programs and other option programs in the late 
1970s.260 The District, again in 1997, sought to encourage 
voluntary integration by creating unique programs in each of 
the ten high schools, in an effort to attract students and 
parents to the school.26l These efforts were unsuccessful in 
creating racially-integrated schools, and should be considered 
an ineffective generally race-conscious method. 
Seattle may also consider implementing a socio-economic 
assignment plan to demonstrate efforts to foster diverse high 
school populations through generally race-conscious 
assignment policies.262 Since the Supreme Court's ruling in 
25/l. !d. at 7HH-S(J. 
25(). !d. at 7/l(J. 
260. The Seattle Open Housing Campaign, supra note 121. 
2()1. Parents Involved Ill, 12() F.:ld at 116(). 
262. Si•:i\TTLE PUB. SCH., supra note 217, at 5 ("'n 2007. the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed that there is a compelling interest in creating diverse student populations and 
that students and society at large benefit from integrated public schools. The Court 
ru!Pd that then• are limits to what a district can do to voluntarily pursue racially 
integrated schools. After the second year of high school assignments under this plan, 
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Parents Involved, advocates of school integration and school 
districts have experimented with utilizing socioeconomic status 
in school assignment procedures. Richard D. Kahlenberg, of the 
Century Foundation, advocates for socioeconomic integration 
as a favored approach to increasing achievement for low-
income students.26:3 Socioeconomic status is a pnmary 
indicator of academic achievement, and has been used by 
school districts, like Chicago, to meet federal desegregation 
decrees.264 Illinois cities Chicago and Champaign, as well as 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania all once used race as a factor in 
student assignment policies, but switched to socioeconomic 
status after the end of their federal desegregation decrees and 
the Court's ruling in Parents Involved.265 
Public schools in Cambridge, Massachusetts, used a race-
based integration plan until 2001, but they now use a 
controlled choice plan based on family socioeconomic status.266 
The Cambridge plan is designed to ensure that all schools are 
within ten percent of the district's overall socioeconomic 
composition, but allows for sibling preference.267 The current 
white population in Cambridge school district is 36.4%, and 
45.5% of students are low-income.268 Of the thirteen schools 
included in the 2009-10 student data report, one school 
enrolled over 50.2% white students, and three schools enrolled 
over 50% low-income students.269 However, not all 
socioeconomic assignment plans have been as successful or 
popularly accepted as the Cambridge plan. 
For example, Wake County in North Carolina, adopted a 
the Superintemknt will report to the School Board and the public on high school 
Pnrolment demographics. Based on that analysis. a determination will be made as to 
whether an economic diversity tiebreaker should be instituted in a subsequent year."). 
26:1. Mary Ann Zehr, Socioeconomics Ueplacinu Haec in Schaul Assiunments, 
l•;nuc. WEEK, May 7, 2010, available at 
http://www .edwt-ek.org/ew/articl,~s/20 1 0/05/12/:l1 poverty.h29.html"tkn= RS U F680XS 
U xQOkBrVVnC'%2 FFTSpEjovxop!\ Fhz&cmp=clp-Pdweek. 
261. /d. 
265. /d. 
266. Erica Frankenberg, Voluntary Integration After J>!zrents involved: What dues 
resl'arch tell us about available options?, 11 (Dec. 2007) (Working Paper for the Charles 
Hamilton Houston Inst. for !{ace & Just. at Harv. L. S<.:h.). 
267. /d. 
2G8. CAMBitiD<;E !'UI3. SCH., STum:N'I' DATA REPOitT: SCHOOL YI•:AI{ 2009-2010, :l 
(201 0), http://www2.cpsd. us/media/network/7752/media/SDH '%202009- 1 O.pdf'!rev=O. 
269. hi. at G (King Open enrolled 50.2'% white students in the 2009-10 school year 
and Fletcher/Maynard, Kt-mwdy-Longfellow, and King '~nrolled Low-income students 
at 69.fi%, 62.8'Y.,, and 5:l.2%, respectively.). 
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socioeconomic status plan in 2000.270 In March 2010, the all-
white Wake County school board, backed by Tea Party 
conservatives, voted to end race and socioeconomic status as 
significant factors in school assignments,271 moving for 
students to instead attend neighborhood schools. North 
Carolina NAACP President, Reverend William Barber, one of 
four demonstrators arrested at the school board vote, described 
the school board's decision as part of a re-segregation 
scheme.272 Dr. Del Burns, Superintendent of the Wake County 
Public Schools, offered his resignation effective in June 2010, 
expressing that he could not, in good conscience, be the 
administrator to end socioeconomic diversity in the school 
system.27:3 If Seattle were to initiate a socioeconomic 
assignment plan as a generally race-conscious effort, public 
acceptance of colorblindness, which asserts that race should 
never be considered, might result in a parent-led challenge of 
the policy, or a school board decision to abandon race-conscious 
socioeconomic assignment policies. 
Seattle could also institute race-conscious assignments that 
generally consider race and ethnicity, as well as parent 
educational level and parent income level, similar to the 
Berkeley United School District's student integration plan in 
California. Berkeley voluntarily integrated its schools in 1968, 
with the primary goal to racially integrate.274 Its current 
270. Brief of Amucis Curiae: Walt Sherlin in Support of J{espondents at :l, Parents 
lnvolwd in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 F.:ld 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 
05-90?1, 05-91 S), 20()() WL ;l(l();\i',() 1 ('!'he bric:fs srwcifically n.fen•nced Wake County's 
socioeconomic status plan as a poor pxample of a "racP neutral" assignment plan, citing 
that racial diversity is a coincidental byproduct of Wake County's plan, and the results 
in WakP County cannot be considered m:cessarily replicable nor gmwralizPd as a 
"succeo;s."). 
271. David Zucchino, North Carolina County Schools Reuersl' Busing Law. L.A 
TiMES, Mar. 25, 2010, auailable at 
http :1 I artie les.l a ti mes.co m/pri n t/20 1 0/ mar/25/ nation/) a-na-raleigh -schoo ls2 5-
2010mar25. 
272. Kosta Harlan, Struggle to Stop Resegregation of Wahe County Schools 1/eats 
Up as Four Ciuil Rights Actiuists are Arrl'sted in NC, Fic:H'rBACK1NEWS, .June 16, 2010, 
auailablc at http://www.fightbacknews.org/201 0/6/17/strugglc:-stop-resegn:gation-wake-
cou nt y -schools-heats -1-civi 1-rights-activists-are-a rn:ste. 
27:1. MsSpentyouth, Sad News for Desegregation and Walle Co. Public Schools, 
Tm: DAILY Kos (Fe: b. 19. 2010), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/02/1 9/S:Jt;6:l6/-Sad-
m•ws-for-desl•gregation -and-WakP-Co-l'ublic-Schools. 
271. Information on Berlwley Unified:~ Student Assignment Plan. BERKELI•:Y Pun. 
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student assignment plans takes into account parent education 
level, parent income level, and race and ethnicity.27fi The 
district utilizes a composite diversity map that takes the three 
"diversity factors" into consideration, and student assignments 
are then based, not on the personal attributes of students, but 
rather, on the diversity characteristics of the "zone" or area in 
which the student lives.276 The Berkeley plan is an example of 
a successful integration plan that has withstood legal scrutiny. 
The Pacific Legal Foundation has challenged the Berkeley's 
integration plan three times in four years. The most recent 
challenge, in 2009, alleged the plan was a violation of Prop 209, 
an ostensible reproduction of the case the foundation helped 
PIICS bring against the Seattle school district in Washington 
District Court.277 While the Berkeley plan may present a 
useful model for adopting a race-conscious assignment plan in 
Seattle, the Pacific Legal Foundation has a history of litigation 
against the Seattle School Board, and may bring litigation 
similar to that which was brought against the Berkeley School 
District. 
Kennedy's concurrence suggests that a school district needs 
to attempt every single school assignment policy that he 
included in his opinion before considering race-conscious 
policies at the individual student level. If all of the generally 
race-conscious policies fail to produce diverse schools, the 
Seattle School Board may then consider using race-conscious 
policies, including individual racial classifications. 
3. Individualized race-conscious assignment policies are not 
impermissible 
Race conscious school assignment policies that assign 
individual students on the basis of race arc not necessarily 
impermissible after Parents Involved. A school district could 
employ such assignment policies and in doing so, challenge the 
Court's adoption of colorblindness in determining the 
constitutionality of secondary school assignments. Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion presents the possibility for school 
Sc H.. http://www. her ke leyschoo Is. net/i 11 form atio11 -on-berkeley-u 11 ifi eds- s tU<IP n t-
assignm,~nt-plan/ (last visited May 11-l, 2012). 
275. !d. 
:no. Id. 
277. Am. Civil !lights Found. v. Berkeley United Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. l{ptr. :lei 7k9, 
798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
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districts like Seattle to utilize race-conscious assignment 
policies that classify individual students on the basis of race 
once race-neutral and generally race-conscious measures are 
exhausted. Kennedy stated: "What the government is not 
permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, 
is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign 
each of them to schools based on that classification."27tl 
Specifically, Kennedy noted that the assignment policies at 
issue were "unconstitutional as the cases now come to us," 
requiring the districts first implement generally race-conscious 
assignment policies.279 This presents the option for districts to 
utilize race-conscious assignment policies that individually 
classify students on the basis of race if previously used 
generally race-conscious policies proved ineffective. 
Kennedy's concurrence specifically stated that race-
conscious individual student assignment policies "would be 
informed by Grutter."280 Therefore, the Seattle School District 
could seek to impose race-conscious assignment policies that 
classify and assign students at the individual level and on the 
basis of race. The District could do so by structuring these 
policies in careful consideration of several issues emphasized 
by Justice Kennedy and within the standard enunciated in 
Grutter. 
First, the district should seek a diverse student body, of 
which racial composition is one element. Kennedy's 
concurrence in Parents Involved specifically stated: "Diversity, 
depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal a school district may pursue."281 Thus, a 
student assignment plan that classifies students individually 
and assigns them on the basis of race must be in furtherance of 
a district goal to seek a diverse student body. 
Second, the district must show that the assignment plan is 
narrowly tailored. Within the standard of Grutter, a school 
district may demonstrate narrow tailoring through 1) a serious 
and good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives; 2) 
using race in a flexible, non-mechanical way; 3) avoiding an 
278. Parents lnvolvf'd IV. fi51 U.S. at 79H. 
279. /d. at 7i'\2. 
280. /d. at 790. 
281. /d. at 78:3. 
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undue burden on non-minority applicants; and 4) limiting the 
assignment policy in time with periodic reviews of the policy's 
continued necessity.282 
Seattle could demonstrate the serious and good faith 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives through its use of 
race-neutral and ineffective assignment policies over the last 
ten years. Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that race-
conscious individual classifications may be utilized when race-
conscious general policies have been exhausted, so Seattle may 
also cite to any race-conscious remedies that have been applied 
at a general level. 
The District would then need to demonstrate that their use 
of race is flexible and non-mechanical.28:3 This could be shown 
through a race-conscious policy that avoids distinctions of 
"white" and "non-white." Both the plurality and Justice 
Kennedy in Parents Inuolued took issue with the binary 
classification of students in the Seattle racial- tiebreaker, 
specifically citing the other racial groups within the District 
and the possibility of non-integrated schools due to the use of 
"crude racial categories."284 The race-conscious plan must also 
avoid using quotas, "a fixed number or percentage which must 
be attained" and must be "flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that 
makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
his or her application."285 The District could assign students 
based on consideration of their individual race by utilizing race 
as a "plus" factor in making individual student assignments, 
using a student's race or ethnicity not as a determining feature 
but merely as part of an "individualized, holistic review" of 
each student.2R6 However, there is a crucial difference between 
student assignments at the secondary school level and at the 
admissions process in higher education: High school students 
do not always submit extensive applications to gain admission 
to a secondary school.287 While it may be possible to implement 
282. Grutter v. Bollinger, 5:i9 U.S. il06, :3il3-4il (200:3). 
28:3. See id. at :3:31. 
284. Parents Involued IV, 551 U.S. at 7H6. 
21-15. Orutter, 5:i9 U.S. at :3:35-:37. 
2HG. /d. at :la6-il7. 
287. See Seattle Pub. Scb., 2012-201:3 HIGH SCHOOL CHOICI•; FOI(M INSTIWCTIONS 
(20 12), available at 
http://www .sea ttleschools. org/mod u les/ grou ps/homepagefi les/cmsll58:31 ilfi/ File/ Forms/ 
Enrollment/High 121 CJ_Generic App _l'kt.pdf!sessionidc=22cf7d07aa0d98298c 1 t•adb22c 
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a race-conscious policy that uses the race of an individual 
student only as a plus factor for high schools with ful1 
application procedures, it is unlikely that this process could 
exist in every Seattle high school. 
Seattle would then have to establish that the race-conscious 
assignment policy does not "unduly burden individuals who arc 
not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups."288 The 
method of avoiding undue burden enunciated in Grutter 
endorses an "individualized inquiry into the possible diversity 
contributions of all applicants."289 Similar to the problems 
presented in demonstrating a flexible and non-mechanical use 
of race, the District would seemingly have to implement a 
robust application procedure for admission to every district 
high school. 
Finally, the District would need to exhibit that its race-
conscious policy is "limited in time" by using "periodic reviews" 
to determine if the assignment policy is necessary "to achieve 
student body diversity."290 The District could satisfy this 
criterion by building in periodic assessments of the efficacy of 
the assignment policy. 
The second and third criteria under the Grutter standard 
demonstrate a significant difference between Lhe secondary 
school and higher education contexts: secondary students do 
not uniformly engage in a comprehensive application process in 
order to attend school.291 Thus, a school district employing this 
three-part proposal may have opportunity to utilize its race-
conscious individualized student assignments on the basis of 
race as a means to challenge the appropriateness of the Grutter 
standard as applied to the secondary school context. In doing 
so, a school district would also have opportunity to confront the 
Court's colorblind approach. 
Justice Kennedy joined the plurality because he agreed that 
the Seattle plan was not narrowly tailored.292 However, the 
c7 ]()61 (High Hchool students applying to attend a St,attlt' Public high school outside 
their attt,ndanct' zom' simply complete an application form which requireH only the 
student's home address and grade.). 
288. Gru.tter, fi:l9 U.S. at :l11. 
289. !d. 
290. /d. at :l12. 
291. See, Seattle Pub. Sch .. supra note, 287. 
292. l'arents lnuulued IV, 551 U.S. at 787. 
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Grutter narrow tailoring analysis is not applicable to the 
secondary school setting where students simply do not engage 
in detailed application processes. Even in a system that would 
require each student and family to submit a comprehensive 
application, there will always be students who, for a variety of 
reasons, do not submit an application. Unlike in higher 
education, secondary students require school assignments in 
order to satisfy compulsory schooling laws. A district that 
implements a race-conscious individualized assignment policy 
after exhausting race-neutral and generally race-conscious 
policies may challenge the applicability of the Grutter standard 
for narrow tailoring as incompatible with secondary school 
circumstances. 
Finally, a school district that implements this three-party 
procedure may challenge the Court's colorblind approach to 
voluntary integration efforts. By first exhausting race-neutral 
and generally race-conscious policies, a district can show 
policies that avoid classifying individual students by race in 
making student assignment decisions that are ineffective to 
achieve student bodies that are racially diverse. This 
demonstration could persuade the Court to recognize that race-
conscious individualized school assignment policies arc 
necessary to promote racial integration, and to ameliorate 
racial isolation and persistent impacts of historical and societal 
racism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The plurality opinion in Parents Involved, not only adopts, 
but also promotes the principle of colorblindness as the 
preferred approach in assessing the constitutionality of race-
conscious policies, and severely restricts the means through 
which school districts may seek to achieve racial integration. 
Colorblindness has emerged as the principal form of resistance 
to race-conscious policies and practices, both as a legal doctrine 
and in public sentiment. This political discourse is exemplified 
through an examination of the history of housing segregation 
in Seattle and the Seattle School Board's struggle integrating 
schools. 
Student assignment policies that voluntarily attempt to 
generate racially integrated schools are currently restricted by 
the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Parents Involved. 
School districts seeking to promote racially diverse schools are 
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confined by this decision, and arc left without clear guidance on 
exactly which student assignment policies are permissible. 
Since abandoning a race-conscious individuali;~,cd student 
assignment plan, Seattle School District's high schools are 
significantly less integrated than they were ten years ago 
before the Parents Involved litigation first began. 
The three-part approach proposed in this comment would 
provide Seattle, and other school districts, with a method 
through which they may institute race-conscious school 
assignment policies. By first exhausting all race-neutral and 
generally race-conscious assignment policies, school districts 
may then, if necessary to achieve racially diverse schools, enact 
race-conscious procedures that assign students individually on 
the basis of race. This comment suggests that the 
implementation of race-conscious assignment policies as the 
third part of this proposal may demonstrate the incompatible 
application of the Grutter standard for narrow tailoring in the 
secondary school context and challenge the Court's utilization 
of colorblindness in determining the constitutionality of 
secondary school assignments. 
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